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STATE TREASON:
THE HISTORY AND VALIDITY OF TREASON
AGAINST INDIVIDUAL STATES
J. Taylor McConkie'
INTRODUCTION
M any lawyers will be surprised to learn that forty-three states currently
have constitutional provisions or criminal statutes that define trea-
son against the state. The United States, as sovereign, can unquestionably
criminalize treason, but do individual states-themselves sovereigns within
the powers not ceded to the federal government-have the power to define
and punish treason? This simple question once grabbed the attention of
the best legal minds. It was among the burning questions that divided the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention and later featured prominently
in leading criminal law treatises. But scholars have not seriously questioned
the validity of state treason laws in over a century. Although some scholars
recognize the significance of the issue,' no one has yet catalogued the semi-
nal authorities or analyzed the issue in light of the modern legal landscape.
This article, by revisiting an old but unresolved debate, seeks to do just
that.
Treason is the highest crime known to law.3 It is more serious than even
murder: the murderer violates a single person or at most only a few, where-
as treason cuts at the welfare and safety of all members of society.4 And the
punishment for treason has always underscored the gravity of the offense.
i Brigham Young University, B.A.; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. Trial Attor-
ney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division. The views expressed in this article
are solely my own, and nothing in this article should be interpreted as reflecting the views or
positions of my current employer. I heartily thank Levi Smylie, David McConkie, Rodney
Morris, and my wife, Wendy, for their review of prior drafts of this article. I also thank the law
librarians at Georgetown University for their assistance in locating difficult-to-find sources.
2 See, e.g., Carlton E W. Larson, The Foigotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy
Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 863,886 (2oo6) ("Whether treason against an individual
state was or is a viable crime is a fascinating question, but one that lies beyond the scope of
this Article.").
3 See, e.g., Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342,347 (1870) ("No crime is greater than treason.").
4 E.g., In re Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1036, 1038 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1861) (No.
18,272) ("Treason is justly considered the highest crime against society. Having for its object
an assault by violence on the government, and thus to effect is overthrow, it may imperil the
happiness and lives of millions.").
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
At common law, traitors were publicly dragged to the place of execution
and there hanged, quartered, and beheaded.' Women had it slightly better:
they were merely hanged and burned.6 Whereas the penalty for murder
was death, for treason, it was death with vengeance. Today, of course, we no
longer quarter and behead criminals, but treason still sits atop the criminal
pyramid and imposes a stigma unmatched by other crimes. And yet, at the
state level, treason is largely a symbolic crime. Since the ratification of the
Constitution, state courts have completed only two treason prosecutions,
both of which occurred over 150 years ago.7
This article has two objectives. The first, largely descriptive, is to pro-
vide an overview of state treason laws from colonial times to today. The
second is to wade into the debate over whether states can define and pun-
ish treason and ultimately reach conclusions that will hopefully encourage
states to take a fresh look at their treason laws.
To achieve these objectives, this article is divided into the follow-
ing sections. Section I sets the stage by outlining the historical roots of
American treason law, including its origins in the English common law, its
importation to America during colonial times, and the debate during the
Constitutional Convention over whether the states would retain the ability
to define treason under the federal Constitution. Section II discusses the
development of state treason laws since ratification of the Constitution,
including a snapshot of state practice during the early years of the Republic
as well as an overview of current laws. This overview yields some surprising
conclusions, including that nearly half of the states that define treason do
so by constitutional provisions that are not self-executing, and therefore
those provisions are likely non-justiciable and unenforceable. Section III
then turns to the historical debate over the validity of state treason laws.
I discuss the key judicial opinions and trace the debate through criminal
law treatises and state legislative histories, showing that, although the is-
sue once ignited strong opinions, it has largely vanished from modern legal
discourse.
In section IV, I offer my own analysis of whether states can define and
punish treason. The validity of the crime ultimately hinges on the mean-
ing of sovereignty in our federalist system of government. I conclude that,
in light of the historical record from the Constitutional Convention and
considering the nature of dual sovereignty and federal criminal jurisdiction,
states have the power to protect against subversive activities through trea-
son laws. The content of the crime, however, is not unbounded and states
should take into account their station in the federal system. States should
not, for example, define treason to include "adhering to the enemies of
5 ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 103 (1930).
6 Id.
7 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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the state" for the simple reason that states lack the power to wage war and
engage in foreign diplomacy, the necessary prerequisites to creating "ene-
mies" under longstanding treason case law. Finally, my conclusion includes
recommendations on how policy makers might update state treason laws to
better reflect contemporary realities, both legal and practical.
I. THE LAW OF TREASON IN AMERICA
A. English Roots
The study of treason is really the study of history. No other constitution-
al provision is as deeply rooted in English history as the Treason Clause.8
William Blackstone wrote that treason "imports a betraying, treachery, or
breach of faith."9 Blackstone further noted that treason against the sover-
eign-termed "high treason"-amounts to the "highest civil crime."' I0 Due
to the gravity of the offense, the crime of treason must therefore be pre-
cisely ascertained. "For if the crime of high treason be indeterminate, this
alone ... is sufficient to make the Government degenerate into arbitrary
power.""
English history prior to Blackstone demonstrated that a loosely defined
treason law led to arbitrary and oppressive power. Blackstone attributed
the oppressive application of treason laws to common law judges who used
their leeway in applying the law in order to please the Crown. This resulted
in a bevy of "constructive treasons" that left English subjects confused and
uncertain about to how to act."2 Illustrating the problem, Blackstone point-
ed to the "very uncertain charge" during the reign of Edward III (1312-
1377) of "accroaching, or attempting to exercise, royal power."' 3 This vague
charge was held to be treason in the case of a knight who forcibly assaulted
and detained one of the King's subjects until he paid a ransom: 14 "[a] crime,
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
9 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 74-75 (Philadelphia,
Evert Duyckinck, George Long, Collins & Co., Collins & Hannay, and Abraham Small, Last
London ed. 1822).
Io Id.
II Id. at 75.
12 Id. ("[By ancient common law, there was a great latitude left in the breast of the
judges, to determine what was treason, or not so: whereby the creatures of tyrannical princes
had opportunity to create abundance of constructive treasons; that is, to raise, by forced and
arbitrary constructions, offences into the crime and punishment of treason, which never were
suspected to be such.").
13 Id. at 75-76.
14 Id. at 76.
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it must be owned, well deserving of punishment: but which seems to be of
a complexion very different from that of treason."15
In an effort to eliminate constructive treasons that had resulted in many
injustices, Parliament passed the Statute of 25 Edward III, or the Treason
Act of 1351. This statute revolutionized the law of treason by attempting
to provide a precise definition. Under the statute, treason fell into one of
seven distinct branches, and if the challenged conduct did not meet one
of the seven branches, it was not treason. 16 Blackstone lauded the statute,
writing: "Thus careful was the legislature, in the reign of Edward the third,
to specify and reduce to a certainty the vague notions of treason, that had
formerly prevailed in our courts."17 Looking back on this history, Thomas
Jefferson appraised the statute more bluntly. In Jefferson's view, Statute
of 25 Edward III was "done to take out of the hands of tyrannical Kings,
and of weak and wicked Ministers, that deadly weapon, which constructive
treason had furnished them with, and which had drawn the blood of the
best and honestest men in the kingdom."' 8
B. Treason Laws Prior to Ratification of the Constitution
In colonial America, there were scattered treason prosecutions prior to
the Revolution, although remaining records are scant.19 As might be ex-
15 Id.
16 These seven branches include: ist: "When a man doth compass or imagine the death
of our lord the king, of our lady his queen, or of their eldest son and heir." Id. 2nd: It is treason
"if a man do violate the king's companion, or the king's eldest daughter unmarried, or the
wife of the king's eldest son and heir." Id. at 8o. 3rd: It is treason to "levy war against our lord
the king in his realm." Id. at 81. 4th: To be "adherent to the king's enemies" or to give them
"aid and comfort in the realm." Id. at 82. 5th: It is treason to "counterfeit the king's great or
privy seal." Id. 6th: It is treason to "counterfeit the king's money; and if a man bring false
money into the realm counterfeit to the money of England, knowing the money to be false,
to merchandise and make payment withal." Id. at 83. 7th: It is treason to "slay the chancellor,
treasurer, or the king's justices of the one bench or the other, justices in eyre, or justices of
assize, and all other justices assigned to hear and determine, being in their places doing their
offices." Id.
17 Id. at 84.
18 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 215 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh eds., Monticello ed. 1904), quotedin Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 21 n.z8 (1945).
19 Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226, 245-46 (1944) (here-
inafter Treason I). In preparation for its hearing of Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945),
the United States Department of Justice requested Professor Hurst to conduct a historical
analysis of treason in America. He published his research in the Harvard Law Review in three
installments. The first, which I will refer to as Treason I, dealt with treason prior to the Con-
stitution. The second installment, Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HARV. L. REV.
395 (1945) (hereinafter Treason I), dealt with the history and policy of the Treason Clause.
The third installment, Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HARv. L. REV. 806 (1945)
(hereinafter Treason III), dealt with the doctrinal development of treason after the adoption of
the Constitution. Professor Hurst later collected these materials into a book. JAMES WILLARD
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pected, the English subjects who had transplanted to America drew ex-
tensively on English law, especially the Statute of 25 Edward III. "Taking
the colonial period as a whole," writes Professor James Willard Hurst, "in
most of the colonies the definition of the offense was clearly thought of in
terms of the English legislation stemming from the Statute of 25 Edward
III."0 Prior to the Revolution, most of the colonies adopted some form of
statute addressing treason." Some of the statutes substantially adopted the
language of the Statute of 25 Edward III, while others simply declared that
the colony would adhere to English law.
22
Although English history demonstrated that broad treason laws led to
abuse, the colonists did not fully internalizethis lesson. In adapting Eng-
lish authorities to their local circumstances, the colonists in some instances
greatly expanded the definition of treason. By the Act of May 6, 1691, for
example, the New York legislature declared it treason "by force or arms
or otherwise to disturb the peace good and quiet" of the Majesty's gov-
ernment. 3 Looking at the whole of colonial history, the law of treason
consistently emphasized the safety of the state over individual liberties,
an unsurprising fact in light of the colonies' circumstances. The colonists
were, after all, separated from their homeland by a massive ocean and sur-
rounded by hostile foreign powers that posed threats to their security.
2 4
The legal histories of many nations illustrate that treason laws are applied
most broadly and forcefully during times of internal insecurity, and colonial
America was no exception.
After the successful Revolution, the delegates to the Continental Con-
gress (who had, of course, themselves engaged in massive acts of treason
against England) adopted a resolution on June 24, 1776 declaring the need
for allegiance, outlining the contours of a treason law, and recommending
that the individual colonies enact treason laws as they saw fit:
Resolved,... That all persons, members of, or owing allegiance to
any of the United Colonies, as before described, who shall levy
war against any of the said colonies within the same, or be ad-
herent to the king of Great Britain, or others the enemies of the
HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: COLLECTED ESSAYS (Stanley I. Kutler ed.,
Greenwood Publ'g Corp. 1971). Professor Hurst remains the seminal authority on American
treason law. For another effective summary of American treason law, see BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON (Univ. of Washington Press 1964).
2o Treason I, supra note 19, at 226.
21 See id. at 232.
22 Id. at 229.
23 Id. at 233.
24 Id. at 235-36 ("Relatively weak and remote settlements, necessarily alert to the near-
ness of hostile empires and Indian tribes, would naturally think first in terms of positive de-
fense against external enemies.").
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said colonies, or any of them, within the same, giving to him or
them aid and comfort, are guilty of treason against such colony:
That it be recommended to the legislatures of the several Unit-
ed Colonies, to pass laws for punishing, in such manner as to
them shall seem fit, such persons before described, as shall be
proveably attainted of open deed, by people of their condition,
of any of the treasons before described."5
All of the colonies except Georgia followed the Continental Congress's
advice and enacted treason statutes, although not all followed the recom-
mended pattern. 6 The pattern provided by the Continental Congress is
significant. The language hearkens back to the Statute of 25 Edward III,
but restricts the definition of treason to just two of the seven branches-
namely, (1) levying war against any of the colonies, and (2) adhering to the
enemies of the colonies, giving them aid and comfort. In seeking to restrict
the content of the crime, the drafters of the resolution evidenced an aware-
ness that existing treason laws in the colonies had expanded dangerously
beyond recognition. 7
But treason legislation continued to grow and broaden over time. 8 In
the later years of the Continental Congress, some legislation became. so
broad that the mere utterance of an unfavorable political opinion could be
treason. The New York Act of March 30, 1781 made it a felony to declare
or maintain "by preaching, teaching, speaking, writing, or printing.., that
the King of Great Britain hath, or of Right ought to have, any Authority, or
Dominion, in or over this State, or the Inhabitants thereof .... 2 9 Broaden-
ing of the law was, again, the product of insecure surroundings. Although
the military conflict with England had ended, Canada was inhabited largely
25 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-89, edited from 'TE ORIGINAL RE-
CORDS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS BY WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD 475 (Washington Gov't
Printing Office 19o6).
26 Treason 1, supra note 19, at 248, n.35. Nine colonies enacted statutes substantially fol-
lowing the Resolution of June 24, 1776 (Del., Mass., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Pa., R.I., and Va.).
Three colonies charted their own course and enacted treason statutes that did not follow the
language of the Resolution (Conn., Md., and S.C.). Georgia did not enact a treason statute.
27 The committee responsible for drafting the language included John Adams, Thomas
Jefferson, John Rutledge, James Wilson, and Robert Livingston. Treason I, supra note 19, at
247. Lawyers of this caliber would have been well acquainted with English precedents and
the dangers of broad treason laws.
28 Treason I, supra note 19, at 250-72; see also United States v. Cramer, 325 U.S. 1, 1O-I I,
n-13 (1945).
29 Treason I, supra note 19, at 266. Virginia enacted a similar law that imposed hefty fines
on any person who "by any word, open deed, or act, advisedly and willingly maintain and
defend the authority, jurisdiction, or power, of the king or parliament of Great Britain ..." Id.
at 267.
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by the English, and English sympathizers remained scattered throughout
the colonies. French and Spanish forces dominated to the west and south.3"
During the years under the Continental Congress, although legislators rec-
ognized that broad and indeterminate treason laws tended to injure indi-
vidual liberty, the security of the embryonic colonies took precedence.3"
C. The Constitutional Convention Debates and Formation of the Treason Clause
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention faced a significant di-
lemma when they met to frame a new system of government. On one hand,
the new republic would not last if the government could not demand the
loyalty of its citizens;3" on the other hand, history had shown that broad
treason laws led to the suppression of political opposition and free speech.33
English experience had also shown that leaving the definition of treason to
judges left the law open to abuse through "constructive treasons."' The
Framers therefore took upon themselves the difficult task of fashioning a
law that would protect the newly formed government from disloyalty and
betrayal, while simultaneously preserving the right of political dissent.
Charles Pinckney took the first step. On May 29, 1787, he submitted
a plan proposing changes to the existing Articles of Confederation.35 The
Pinckney Plan provided that Congress "shall have the exclusive Power of
declaring what shall be Treason & Misp. of Treason agt. U.S."36 Possibly us-
ing the Pinckney plan as a springboard, on August 6, 1787, the Committee
on Detail reported a draft constitution that contained the first draft of the
Treason Clause.3 7 The Committee's draft stated as follows:
30 Justice Jackson's opinion in Cramer, 325 U.S. at 8, highlights this history:
[People during the founding generation] were far more awake to powerful ene-
mies with designs on this continent than some of the intervening generations have
been. England was entrenched in Canada to the north and Spain had repossessed
Florida to the south, and each had been the scene of invasion of the Colonies; the
King of France had but lately been dispossessed in the Ohio Valley; Spain claimed
the Mississippi Valley; and except for the seaboard, the settlements were surround-
ed by Indians-not negligible as enemies themselves, and especially threatening
when allied to European foes.
31 Summarizing the period between the Revolution and ratification of the Constitution,
Professor Hurst concludes: "Thus the period of the Revolution introduces cautionary notes
regarding the scope of 'treason' such as were not seen in the colonial era; but the evidences of
the new trend are only suggestive and wavering in their implications. The burden of the story
remains the security of the state." Treason I, supra note 19, at 256.
32 See Treason I, supra note 19, at 257-58.
33 Treason I, supra note 19, at 250-72; see also Cramer, 325 U.S. at 10-12, n. 13.
34 4 BLACKSTONE supra note 9, at 75-76.
35 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 16 (Max Farrand, ed. 1911).
36 2 TIE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 136 (Max Farrand, ed. 1911).
The reference to "Misp. of Treason" refers to misprision of treason, a crime committed by one
who has knowledge of treasonous acts but fails to report to it to the proper authority.
37 Id. at 18z.
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Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying
war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering to
the enemies of the United States, or any of them. The Legisla-
ture of the United States shall have power to declare the punish-
ment of treason. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless
on the testimony of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall
work corruption of bloods nor forfeiture, except during the life
of the person attainted.
38
This draft is significant because treason against a state is made treason
against the entire Union, effectively erasing a state's ability to define and
punish the crime. Under the draft, treason against the United States con-
sists of levying war against the United States, "orany of them," and of adher-
ing to the enemies of the United States, "or any of them." 9
The delegates debated this draft on August 20, 1787.40 The debate cov-
ered several issues relating to the substantive elements of the crime, and
in every instance, the outcome was to restrict the offense.4' In so doing,
the delegates guarded against the dangers inherent in the broad treason
laws of past generations. 41 In later years, the Framers viewed the Treason
Clause with great pride, interpreting its inclusion in the Constitution as an
important victory for individual liberty. James Wilson, for instance, boasted
that a "single sentence comprehends our whole of national treason," a sen-
tence that resulted from "mature experience, and ascertained by the legal
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 340-41.
41 For instance, Madison (somewhat uncharacteristically) opened the debate by unsuc-
cessfully arguing that the draft was too narrow and ought to be broadened to align more with
the Statute of 25 Edward III. See 2 FARRANDo , supra note 36, at 345. Another topic of debate
included the phrase "adhering to the enemies of the United States"; George Mason moved to
insert "'giving <them> aid comfort'[] as restrictive of'adhering to their Enemies &c'-the lat-
ter he thought would be otherwise too indefinite," and the motion prevailed. Id. at 349. On the
evidentiary requirement of two witnesses, the delegates agreed to insert after "two witnesses"
the words "to the same overt act." Id. at 348. Benjamin Franklin supported the amendment
because "prosecutions for treason were generally virulent; and perjury too easily made use of
against innocence." Id.
42 For example, in Federalist No. 43, writing in defense of the Treason Clause, Madison
noted that:
[A]s new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which
violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked
their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment,
opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition
of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the
Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond
the person of its author.
lYlE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 3 10 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
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interpretation, of numerous revolving centuries. ' 43 Alexander Hamilton, in
answering the criticism that the early Constitution lacked a Bill of Rights,
listed the Treason Clause among the constitutional provisions protecting
individual liberty. 4
Most of the debate at the Constitutional Convention focused on how
the crime should fit into the federal system. Numerous delegates favored
denying states the ability to enact treason laws, grounding their arguments
in federal sovereignty and national cohesion. Gouverneur Morris, for in-
stance, "was for giving to the Union an exclusive right to declare what shd.
be treason."4 He reasoned that "[i]n case of a contest between U- S-and a
particular State, the people of the latter must, under the disjunctive terms
of the clause, be traitors to <one> or other authority."' William Samuel
Johnson "contended that Treason could not be both agst. the U. States -
and individual States; being an offence agst the Sovereignty which can be
but one in the same community."47 He similarly asserted that "there could
be no Treason agst a particular State. It could not even at present, as the
Confederation now stands; the Sovereignty being in the Union; much less
can it be under the proposed System."48 Rufus King held essentially the
same view, stating that "no line can be drawn between levying war and
adhering to [the] enemy - agst the U. States and agst an individual States
- Treason agst the latter must be so agst the former."4 9 John Dickenson
similarly opined that "war or insurrection agst a member of the Union must
be so agst the whole body; but the Constitution should be made clear on
this point."5 "
Those on the other side articulated a stronger view of state power and
drew finer distinctions in federal and state sovereignty. In response to
Johnson's statements, George Mason stated that "the United States will
have a qualified sovereignty only. The individual States will retain a part of
the Sovereignty. An act may be treason agst a particular State which is not
so against the U. States."51 Mason bolstered his position with reference to
43 3 JAMES WILSON, WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 99-1OO (Bird Wilson ed.,
Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804).
44 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 533 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
45 2 FARRAND, supra note 36, at 345.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 346.
48 Id. at 347. Johnson's view that there could be no state treason even under the Articles
of Confederation is somewhat perplexing. As we have seen, the Continental Congress recom-
mended that the states enact treason laws, and nearly all of them did so. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
49 2 FARRAND, supra note 36, at 349.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 347.
2012-20131
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Bacon's Rebellion, an example where violence against the ruling authority
was directed at state officials due to state policies."2 James Wilson stated
that, in most cases, treason would be an offense against the entire United
States, "yet in many cases it may be otherwise."53 Oliver Ellsworth stated
that "the U.S. are sovereign on one side of the line dividing the jurisdic-
tions - the States on the other - each ought to have power to defend their
respective Sovereignties.""' For his part, Roger Sherman suggested a prac-
tical way to divide the crime among dual sovereignties: "resistance agst the
laws of the U- States as distinguished from resistance agst the laws of a
particular State, forms the line.
55
The issue came to resolution as the delegates considered several
amendments to the original draft. Although the delegates debated nu-
merous amendments, action on three proposals primarily shaped the out-
come. First, a majority of delegates agreed to strike "or any of them" after
"United States."56 Second, on a 6-5 vote, they rejected a proposal that the
United States should have the "sole" power to declare the punishment
for treason.57 And third, on another 6-5 vote, a majority voted to keep the
language "against the United States" after "treason."5" Had modern word-
processing been available, the delegates could have produced a simple
red-line showing how the final version had evolved out of the Committee
on Detail's initial draft:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against e... U.....d a them, or any-of -hle e, and in ad-
hering to the ..... e.,f the. Un.itd Se..... y of e... their
Enemies. giving them Aid and Comfor T... ......... of t
UnitId Ste sha have pw , declare... pun.in'.... of
treason. No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confes-
sion in open Court.. -of .. a....llw corion
OF bkloo , , n i fm--f ....i.... . ... . , L if. of . h p.. .... n
attaineed.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person at-
tainted.
52 Id. Bacon's Rebellion is considered the first rebellion in the American colonies. In
1676, about i,ooo armed Virginians rose up against the governor of the state because they
were upset that the governor failed to retaliate for a series of attacks on the colonists by Na-
tive Americans.
53 Id. at 348. Wilson also acknowledged the difficulty of the issue, adding that "the sub-
ject.., was intricate and he distrusted his present judgment on it." Id.
54 2 FAR AND, supra note 36, at 349.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 346.
57 Id. at 348.
58 Id. at 349.
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The end result was a victory for the delegates in favor of state treason
laws. In rejecting the proposal to give the United States the "sole" power
to punish treason and in defining treason as "against the United States,"
the states retained the ability to define treason according to their own stan-
dards, a concept that was later reinforced by the language of the Tenth
Amendment.5 9
Throughout the debate, Madison repeatedly expressed concern that
if the United States and individual states shared a concurrent power to
define treason, the same criminal act could result in prosecution by both
sovereigns.6° The final language of the Treason Clause did nothing to al-
lay his concern. At the conclusion of the debate, Madison noted that he
was "not satisfied with the footing on which the clause now stood. As
treason agst the U-States involves Treason agst particular States, and
vice versa, the same act may be twice tried & punished by the different
authorities-. '6 1 But Madison's dissatisfaction notwithstanding, a majority
of delegates decided to live with the possibility of multiple prosecutions
for the same criminal act if it meant the states retained the power to define
and punish treason.
II. STATE TREASON SINCE THE CONSTITUTION
A. Overview of State Practice Following Ratification of the Constitution
As we have seen, while operating under the Articles of Confederation,
each of the thirteen states except Georgia enacted legislation defining trea-
son. 6 Following ratification of the Constitution, the states moved in differ-
ent ways and at different speeds in defining treason.
The original thirteen states did not act immediately to address treason.
By 1800, only five of the thirteen states had enacted new laws defining
59 The Tenth Amendment, ratified on December 15, 1791, states: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X. This amendment merely
distilled the structural logic of the Constitution that a state, when authorized by its own laws,
can enact any law not inconsistent with the Constitution.
60 For example, Madison said he was not satisfied with the Committee on Detail's origi-
nal draft because "it would seem that the individual States wd. be left in possession of a con-
current power so far as to define & punish treason particularly agst. themselves; which might
involve double punishment." 2 FARRAND, supra note 36, at 346.
6 1 Id. at 349.
62 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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treason: New Hampshire, 63 Delaware, 64 Virginia,6 New Jersey,66 and Mas-
sachusetts. 67 By 1820, four more had enacted new laws defining treason:
New York,68 South Carolina,6 9 Georgia,70 and Connecticut.71 The remaining
four states-Rhode Island,7 2 Pennsylvania,73 North Carolina,7 4 and Mary-
land 75 -acted between 1838 and 1862. The fact that the original thirteen
states waited years or even decades after ratification of the Constitution
to update their definition of treason shows that the states were content to
rely on statutes or common law that existed prior to the creation of the new
Union.76
Of the remaining thirty-seven states that joined the Union after ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, thirty-two states included provisions defining
63 Act of Feb. 8, 1791, i792 N.H. Laws 243.
64 DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. V, § 4.
65 Va. Act of Dec. 26, 1792, Ch. CXXXVI, reprinted in A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, As ARE Now IN
FORCE 282 (Richmond, Augustine Davis, 1794).
66 Act of March 18, 1796, Ch. DC, § 1,1795 N.J. Laws 92 (1796).
67 An Act against Treason and Misprision of Treason, and for regulating Trials in such
Cases, Ch. LXXI, § 2 (originally passed in 1777 and recodified in 1799), reprinted in 3 ThE
PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. app. at 121 (Boston, I. Thomas & E.T.
Andrews, 18oi).
68 Act of Mar. 20, 18o, ch. 29, 18oI N.Y Laws 45.
69 Act of Dec. 19, 18o5, tit. 153, § 4, reprintedin 2 AN ALPHABETICAL DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC
STATUTE LAW OF SOUTH-CAROLINA 202 (Joseph Brevard ed., 1814).
70 Ga. Penal Code, 4th Div., §§ 2-3 (1816), reprinted in A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF
THE STATE OF GEORGIA, PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE SINCE THE YEAR 1810 TO THE YEAR 1819,
INCLUSIVE 567 (Lucius Q. C. Lamar ed., 1821).
71 CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IX, § 4.
72 Act of Jan. 1838, ch. I, § 1, 1838 R.I. Pub. Laws 3.
73 Act of Mar. 31, 1 86o, tit. I, § I, I 86o Pa. Laws 385.
74 Act of May I I, 1861, ch. 59, § I, 1859 N.C. Sess. Laws 144.
75 Act of Mar. 6, 1862, ch. 235, sec. 202, § 202, 1861 Md. Laws 250.
76 Pennsylvania and Maryland illustrate this point. In 1794, the Pennsylvania legislature
enacted a statute establishing new penalties for treason committed under the pre-ratification
statutes. 5 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 2 (M. Carey and J. Bioren eds.,
1803). After ratification of the Constitution, the Pennsylvania legislature did not enact a new
statute defining treason until 186o. Act of Mar. 31, 186o, tit. I, § I, 186o Pa. Laws 385. Similarly,
Maryland first defined treason in 1777. Act of Feb. 1777, ch. XX, 1777 Md. Laws xix. In 181o,
Maryland updated the penalty for the crime of "high treason against the state," but did not
define the crime, leaving the prior definition from 1777 untouched. SeeAct of Jan. 6, 181o, ch.
CXXXVIII, 18o9 Md. Laws lxxxviii (181o). Maryland did not update its definition of treason
until 1862. See Act of Mar. 6, 1862, ch. 235, sec. 202, § 202, 1861 Md. Laws 250 (1862). Regard-
ing the common-law nature of state treason, Francis Wharton noted in 1861 that "[tireason
is undoubtedly a common law offence in each state, aside from constitutional and statutory
provisions, and is recognized as having a substantive and independent existence ..." 2 FRAN-
CIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 2766 (5th ed. 1861)
(citation omitted).
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treason in their first constitutions. 7" The five that did not were Vermont,
Tennessee, Ohio, Illinois, and Hawaii. Each of these states except Hawaii
enacted a criminal statute defining treason after reaching statehood.78 Ha-
waii is the only state that has never had a constitutional provision or statute
on treason since joining the United States.79
Examining the substance of each state's early treason laws would re-
quire more space than is available here. We can, however, note a few gen-
eral features that characterize the states' early definitions of the crime.
Most states followed the federal pattern by defining the crime in the state
constitution itself. Thirty-four of the fifty states inserted constitutional
provisions that copied the definition of treason from the Treason Clause
almost verbatim, merely substituting the name of the state for "the United
States.'80 Fifteen states opted to define treason through a criminal statute
instead.8' These statutes included the same two branches of treason out-
77 ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, § 2; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.10 (enacted in 1956); ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 28 (enacted in 1912); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VII, § 2; CAL. CONST. of 1849,
art. I, § 20; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 9 (enacted in 1876); FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. XVI, § 4; IDAHO
CONST. art. V, § 5 (enacted in 1889); IND. CONST. of I816, art. XI, §§ 2-3; IOWA CONST. of 1846,
art. II, § 16; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 13 (enacted in 1859); Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII,
§ I; LA. CONST. of 1812, art VI, § 2; ME. CONST., art. I, § 12 (enacted in 1820); MICH. CONST. of
1835, art. I, § 16; MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 9 (enacted in 1858); Miss. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § IO;
Mo. CONST. of i82o, art. XIII, § 15; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 9; NEB. CONST. of 1866,
art. I, § io; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 19 (enacted in 1864); N.M. CONST. art. II, § I6; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 19 (enacted in 1889); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (enacted in 1907); OR. CONST. art. 1, §
24 (enacted in 1857); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 25 (enacted in 1889); TEx. CONST. of 1845, art. VII,
§ 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 19 (enacted in 1895);WASH. CONST. art. I, § 27 (enacted in 1889); W.
VA. CONST. of 1863, art. II, § 10; WIS. CONST. art. I, § lO (enacted in 1848);Wyo. CONST. art. I, §
26 (enacted in 1889).
78 See Act of Mar. 9, 1797, ch. XXXII, § i, reprinted in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT
332 (Thomas Tolman ed., 1808); Tenn. Code § 4743 (1858); Act of Jan. 15, 1805, ch. 1, § I, 1804
Ohio Laws 1 (1805); Act of Mar. 23, 1819, § I, 1819 Ill. Laws 212.
79 Hawaii had treason laws prior to joining the United States. See, e.g., PENAL CODE OF
THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF NOBLES AND REPRESENTATIVES 9 (Honolulu,
Henry M. Whitney, 1850) (Penal Code, Ch. VI, § i). In the process of becoming a United
States territory, Hawaii repealed all laws that were seen as inconsistent with the United States
Constitution, and the treason law was among the criminal statutes repealed. SeeAct of May 27,
191o, §§ 6-7, 1911 Haw. Sess. Laws 307-09.
80 Of the original thirteen states, the first constitutions of Delaware and Connecticut
followed this pattern, DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. V, § 4; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IX, § 4, as did
the constitutions of each of the thirty-two states identified in supra note 77.
81 The i5 states include: Maryland (Act of Mar. 6, 1862, ch. 235, § 202, 1861 Md. Laws
250 (1862)); North Carolina (Act of May I I, 1861, ch. 59, § I, 1859 N.C. Sess. Laws 144);
Pennsylvania (Act of Mar. 31, i86o, tit. I, § 1, 186o Pa. Laws 385); Tennessee (Tenn. Code
§ 4743 (1858)); Rhode Island (Act of Jan. 1838, ch. i, § 1, 1838 R.I. Pub. Laws 3); Illinois (Ill.
Act of Mar. 23, 1819, § I, 1819 Il. Laws 212); Georgia (Ga. Penal Code, 4th Div., §§ 2-3 (I816),
reprinted in A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, PASSED BY THE LEGISLA-
TURE SINCE THE YEAR 1810 TO THE YEAR 1819, INCLUSIVE 567 (Lucius Q. C. Lamar ed., 182 1));
South Carolina (Act of Dec. 19, 1805, tit. 153, § 4, reprinted in 2 AN ALPHABETICAL DIGEST OF
2012-20131
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
lined in the Treason Clause: (1) "levying war" against the state, and (2)
"adhering to the state's enemies, giving them aid and comfort. '8 2 Thus, left
with the power to define treason according to their own preferences, states
generally followed the same policy of the Treason Clause by restricting the
content of the crime.
There were, however, some deviations from the restrictive policy. Per-
haps the most dramatic example is South Carolina's 1805 statute that made
it treason to connect oneself, directly or indirectly, "with any slave or slaves
in a state of actual insurrection within this state" or to "excite, counsel, ad-
vise, induce, aid, comfort or assist any slave or slaves to raise or attempt to
raise an insurrection within this state."83 Merely affording shelter or protec-
tion to slaves assembling for any purpose "tending to treason or insurrec-
tion" violated the statute and was punishable by death.'
Other states broke from the restrictive policy by expanding the defini-
tion of treason to include acts aimed at the United States. New Jersey, for
example, made it treason to "adhere to [the State's] enemies, or the enemies
of the United States, giving them aid or comfort within this state or elsewhere
... "-8 Illinois similarly made it treason to "levy war against the United States
or against this state" or to "assist any enemies at war against the United States
or this state." Apparently it did not occur to these states that, because the
Treason Clause exclusively defines treason against the United States, state
laws attempting to cover the same terrain were invalid.87 Perhaps this is the
THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAW OF SOUTH-CAROLINA 202 (Joseph Brevard ed., I814)); Ohio (Act of
Jan. 15, I8O5, ch. I, § 1, 18o4 Ohio Laws 1 (I8O5)); NewYork (Act of Mar. 2o, 18oi, ch. 29, 18ol
N.Y. Laws 45); Vermont (Act of Mar. 9, 1797, ch. XXXII, § i, reprintedin I LAWS OF THE STATE
OF VERMONT 332 (Thomas Tolman ed., 18o8)); New Jersey (Act of Mar. i8, 1796, ch. DC, § I,
1795 N.J. Laws 92 (1796)); Virginia (Act of Dec. 26, 1792, Ch. CXXXVI, reprintedin A COLLEC-
TION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT
NATURE, As ARE Now IN FORCE 282 (1794)); New Hampshire (Act of Feb. 8, 1791, 1792 N.H.
Laws 243 (1792)); and Massachusetts (An Act against Treason and Misprison of Treason, and
for regulating Trials in such Cases, ch. LXXI, § 2 (1777), reprinted in 3 THE PERPETUAL LAWS
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. app. at 121 (Boston, I. Thomas and E.T Andrews, I8o)).
82 See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3. South Carolina is the only state whose post-ratification
treason law did not include the two branches. See Act of Dec. I9, 1805, tit. 153, § 4, reprinted
in 2 AN ALPHABETICAL DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAW OF SOUTH-CAROLINA 202 (Joseph
Brevard ed., 1814).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Act of Mar. I8, 1796, ch. DC, § I, 1795 N.J. Laws 92, 92 (emphasis added).
86 Act of Mar. 23, 1819, § I, 1819 Il. Laws 212, 212 (emphasis added).
87 The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal
crimes. See discussion infra note 309 and accompanying text. See also People v. Lynch, I I
Johns. 549, 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814) (holding that "the jurisdiction of the State courts does not
extend to the offense of treason against the United States"); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1296, at 173 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray and Co.
1833) ("The power of punishing the crime of treason against the United States is exclusive
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reason that Tennessee amended its treason statute in 1861 by striking all
references to treason against the United States."
New Hampshire and Vermont also broke from the restrictive policy-
although more subtly-when they included conspiracy to levy war against
the state within the definition of treason.8 9 By expanding the definition
of treason to include conspiracy to levy war, these statutes broadened the
category of treasonous conduct and diluted the requirement that the pros-
ecution prove treason by overt acts. Chief Justice Marshall made this point
in Exparte Bollman,9° a federal case involving two civilians who allegedly
helped recruit for Aaron Burr's failed attempt to set up a separate empire
in New Orleans, with himself as ruler.91 "However flagitious may be the
crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such
conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are dis-
tinct offences."92 To constitute a levying of war, wrote Marshall, "there must
be an actual assembling of men for the treasonable purpose."93 The Court
held that merely conspiring to levy war by helping with recruitment did
not satisfy the "levying war" prong:
In the case now before the court, a design to overturn the gov-
ernment of the United States in New-Orleans by-force, would
have been unquestionably a design which, if carried into execu-
tion, would have been treason, and the assemblage of a body of
men for the purpose of carrying it into execution would amount
to levying of war against the United States; but no conspiracy for
this object, no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying
of war.Y
in congress; and the trial of the offence belongs exclusively to the tribunals appointed by
them."). Illinois and New Jersey, it should be noted, eventually dropped the troublesome "of
the United States" and "against the United States" language from their treason laws. The
current treason law of those states omits that language. See infra note 95.
88 Act of May 3, 1861, ch. 8, § I, 1861 Tenn. Pub. Acts 36, 36 (the State's treason statute
was "amended that so much of the same as speaks of the United States, and defines offences
against the United States as treason, is hereby repealed").
89 Act of Feb. 8, 1791, 1792 N.H. Laws 243, 243 (1792) (stating that it shall be treason to
"levy war or conspire to levy war against the same"); i LAws OF THE STATE OF VERIONT, supra
note 78, at 332 (same).
90 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (18O7).
91 Id. at 1z6.
92 Id. (emphasis added). Modern treason law recognizes the difference between levying
war and conspiracy to levy war, with less severe penalties attached to conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2381 (2oo6) (treason); 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2oo6) (seditious conspiracy).
93 Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 126.
94 Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
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By refusing to allow a conspiracy to levy war, Justice Marshall narrowed
the scope of the crime. His reasoning, although applied in the context of a
federal case, is equally applicable to state treason laws.
B. Overview Of Current State Treason Laws
Currently forty-three states have laws defining treason against the
state.9" In light of the development of the crime of treason from the Eng-
lish common law, to the Treason Clause, to the early state laws, one would
expect current state laws to adhere to a restrictive pattern by incorporating
the "levying war" and "adhering to the state's enemies" branches of trea-
son. And, indeed, the substantive definition of treason in all forty-three
states incorporates these two branches of treason.
There are, of course, some differences among the states' laws. The
Georgia Constitution, rather than using the typical "levying war" language,
defines treason as "insurrection against the state, adhering to the state's en-
emies, or giving them aid and comfort."96 Indiana's definition includes
"giving aid and comfort to its enemies" but omits the typical "adhering
to the state's enemies" language.97 A few states add a knowledge element,
stating that treason consists of "knowingly" or "intentionally" levying war
or adhering to the state's enemies.98 And in Virginia, in addition to the two
95 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 18; ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § I o; ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 28; ARK. CONST.
art. II, § 14; CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 18; COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 9; CONN. CONsT. art. IX, § 4; DEL.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 2o; GA. CONsT. art. I, § I, Para. 19; IDAHO CONST. art. V,§ 5; IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 28, 29; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 16; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 13; Ky.
CONST. § 229; ME. CONsT. art. I, § 12; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 22; MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 9; Miss.
CONST. art. III, § 1O; MO. CONsT. art. I, § 30; MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 30; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 14;
NEV. CONsT. art. I, § 19; N.J. CONsT. art. I, para. 17; N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 16; N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 29; N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 17; OKLA. CONsT. art. II, § 16; OR. CONsT. art. I, § 24; S.C. CONST. art.
I, § 17; S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 25;TEx. CONST. art. I, § 22; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 19; WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 27; W.VA. CONST. art. II, § 6;Wis. CONST. art. I, § Io;WYo. CONST. art. I, § 26; ALA. CODE
§ 13A-I 1-2 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-51-201 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 37 (West 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-11-101 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.32 (West 2ooo); GA. CODE ANN. §
16-- 1-1 (20 11); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/30-I (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5901 (2012); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:113 (2004); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 264, § I (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.544 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.385 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. §
97-7-67 (West 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 576.070 (West 201 i); NEV. REV. STAT. § 196.o10 (2011);
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.o05 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-43-1 (zooz); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3401
(2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-481 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.82.010 (zoo8); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-1 (LexisNexis 2oo); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.O1 (West 2005).
96 GA. CONsT. art I, § I, ' XIX (emphasis added). The statutory counterpart reverts to the
term "levies war." GA. CODE ANN. § I6-1 i-i(a) (2011 ).
97 See IND. CONST. art I, § 28.
98 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-1 (720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5 / 30-1 (West 2010); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5901 (2012). The treason laws in most states do not contain a knowledge re-
quirement, and adding such language is arguably superfluous as treason is generally thought
to be a specific intent crime. See, e.g., United States v. Cramer, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945) ("[T]o
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branches of treason typically included, treason also consists of establishing
a separate government within the state limits, holding or executing any
office in such separate government, or resisting the execution of state laws
under color of state authority.99
Surprisingly, a few states perpetuate some of the mistakes seen in the
earliest definitions of state treason. Louisiana's definition of treason, for
instance, includes levying war "against the United States" and adhering to
the enemies "of the United States," even though the State lacks jurisdiction
over such acts. 0 Louisiana's earliest treason law adhered to the more re-
strictive pattern, with the expansion not arising until more modern times."'
Vermont continues to include in the definition of treason a conspiracy to
levy war, as it has since 1797, whereas Minnesota specifically excludes con-
spiracy from its definition of levying war."' In this regard, Minnesota is
more in line with the restrictive policy underlying American treason law.
The seven states currently without a treason law are Hawaii, Maryland,
New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. 103 Hawaii,
as noted above, is unique in that it has never had a treason law since be-
coming a state.) 4 The other six states all had treason laws at some point
but repealed them.1°5 The legislative records generally do not explain why
make treason the defendant not only must intend the act, but he must intend to betray his
country by means of the act.").
99 VA. CODE ANN. § I8.2-48I(3)-(5) (2009).
1OO LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:113 (2004) (emphasis added).
IOi Compare LA. CONST. art VI, § 2 (18 12), with LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 14:I13 (2004).
I02 Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I3, § 3401 (West 2009), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.385
(West 2oo9) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5901 (2012); see also N.D. R. CRIM. P. 31(e)(3) ("If a
defendant is charged with treason or conspiracy to commit treason and more than one overt act
is charged, the jury, before returning a verdict of guilty, must return a special verdict on each
overt act charged.") (emphasis added).
I03 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining that forty-three states currently
have laws defining treason).
104 Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
1o5 Maryland repealed its treason statute in I953. See MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAw, art. 27,
§§ 654-62 (I95I) (defining treason against Maryland), repealed by Act of April II, 1953, 1953
Md. Laws 775. New Hampshire repealed its treason statute in 1973. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:586 (1955) (defining treason against New Hampshire), repealedby Act of July 2, 1973, 1973
N.H. Laws 1olo-i I. New York's treason statute was omitted from the I965 redrafting of the
criminal code. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2516 (omitting from the code treason against New York,
Article 2I2, §§ 2380-83). Ohio repealed its treason statute in I974 with the redrafting of the
criminal code. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.01 (LexisNexis 1953) (defining treason against
Ohio), repealedby Act of Dec. 22, 1972, 1971 Ohio Laws 2033 (effective Jan. I, 1974). Pennsyl-
vania's treason statute was repealed in 1972 when the state redrafted its criminal code. See also
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4201 (West I963) (defining treason against Pennsylvania), repealed
by Act of Dec. 6, I972, 1972 Pa. Laws 1482 (effective June 6, I973). In addition, Tennessee
repealed its treason statute in 1989 with the redrafting of the criminal code. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-5-802 (1982) (defining treason against Tennessee), repealed by Tenn. Act of May 24, 1989,
1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1169.
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the statutes were repealed, but repeal likely reflects a view that the likeli-
hood of treason against a state is so remote as to render the need for the
law obsolete."6 Maryland repealed its law, for example, as part of a move-
ment in the state to "remove many obsolete and out-moded provisions and
to make the criminal laws more orderly and more brief."'017 Perhaps these
states were also persuaded by the position of the American Law Institute,
which in 1962 omitted treason from the Model Penal Code because it fell
within a category of crimes that "are peculiarly the concern of the federal
government" and because the definition "is inevitably affected by special
political considerations." 108
Even among the states that repealed the law, vestiges of the crime re-
main on the books. In New York, for example, the governor has the power
to grant reprieves for all offenses except treason, although the governor can
suspend execution of a treason sentence until the legislature has reviewed
the sentence to decide whether to grant a pardon. 10 9 Provisions such as
these are meaningless in the absence of a state treason law and their con-
tinued existence is best explained by inattentive state legislatures. Al-
though legislatures may repeal the substantive offense, they fail to account
for other provisions in their state's law that refer to or incorporate the crime
of treason.
A final observation about the current landscape deals with the source
of the law. Of the forty-three states that define treason, twenty-one do so
solely by constitutional provision,"0 sixteen do so by pairing a constitu-
tional provision with a criminal statute,"' and six do so solely by statute."'
This raises the question whether the source of the law has any impact on
its enforceability.
Most constitutional provisions declare broad principles of fundamental
law that require action by the legislature to put them into effect, but a con-
stitutional provision can be self-executing if it sufficiently articulates a rule
that takes effect without the need for additional legislation."3 However, a
1o6 Id.
107 Act of April 11, 1953, § I, 1953 Md. Laws 775.
io8 See MODEL PENAL CODE, Definition of Specific Crimes, 123 (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
109 N.Y. CONST. art. 4, § 4.
I io Supra note 95 (Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming).
ij Supra note 95 (Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin).
112 Supra note 95 (Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Vir-
ginia).
113 See, e.g., Dev. Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524, 530-31 (Colo. 2oo8); see also I6 AM. JUR.
2d Constitutional Law §§ 101, 104 (2009).
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provision is not self-executing-and therefore non-justiciable-if it mere-
ly announces a principle but lacks the rules by which the principle is given
the force of law.114 The Treason Clause defines treason but leaves it to Con-
gress to declare a punishment, suggesting that the provision is not self-ex-
ecuting because it cannot stand on its own without additional legislation.11
One could argue, of course, that the Treason Clause is self-executing (and
courts have not addressed the issue), but the fact that, after ratification of
the Constitution, the first Congress promptly enacted a treason statute par-
roting the text of the Treason Clause and providing a punishment suggests
that additional legislation was necessary to give it effect." 6
Regarding state practice, each of the twenty-one states that define trea-
son solely by constitutional provision do so by defining treason against the
state and then setting out procedural safeguards for treason trials (i.e., by
stating that no person can be convicted except on the testimony of two
witnesses or an open confession in court)." 7 By defining the elements of
the offense and establishing procedures for trial, the state constitutional
provisions arguably articulate a rule that takes effect without the need of
additional legislation, thus making them self-executing.
The better argument, however, as with the Treason Clause, is that the
state constitutional provisions are not self-executing. None of the twenty-
one states that define treason solely by constitutional provision include a
penalty in the text of the constitution.118 The result is that those states
have created a public right of action without any corresponding penalty.
Although this peculiarity has never been raised or addressed by a judicial
body, if faced with this issue, a court would likely conclude that a state
constitutional provision defining treason in this manner is not self-execut-
ing because additional legislation is required to give it legal force." 9 Thus,
114 16 AM. JuR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw §§ 101, 104 (2009).
115 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment
of Treason.").
116 See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, Ch. 9,
i Stat. I 12, 112 (790) ("That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States
of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid or
comfort within the United States or elsewhere, and shall be thereof convicted.. of treason.").
Without deciding the issue, Professor Hurst lends some weight to the conclusion that the
Treason Clause is not self-executing: "[In view of the legislative construction evidenced
by the promptness with which the first Congress declared the crime of treason, substantially
in the terms of the Constitution, it might be argued that Art. III, § 3 is not self-executing."
Treason II, supra note 19, at 420 n. 128.
117 Supra note 95 (Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming).
i18 See id.
i19 See, e.g., Older v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 770, 780 (Cal. 191o) ("A constitutional
provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which
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although forty-three states have treason laws on the books, there is a com-
pelling argument that the law in twenty-one of those states is merely sym-
bolic, having no practical impact.
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE VALIDITY OF STATE TREASON LAWS
One might assume that there is not much to debate over the validity
of state treason laws. After all, the debates at the Constitutional Conven-
tion show that the Framers specifically contemplated state treason and the
text of the Constitution itself contemplates state treason laws in at least
two places.' Nevertheless, from the beginning, there have been dissent-
ing voices. I first summarize key judicial decisions and then look briefly at
how the debate has unfolded in scholarly journals, criminal law treatises,
and state legislative histories.
A. Judicial Decisions Regarding State Treason
State courts have decided surprisingly few cases involving state treason.
Since ratification of the Constitution, state courts have completed only two
treason prosecutions.' The first was Rhode Island's 1844 prosecution of
Thomas Dorr; the second was Virginia's 1859 prosecution of John Brown.'
In both cases, the defense argued that state treason is an unconstitutional
usurpation of federal authority, but in both cases, the court held other-
wise.12 3
the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duly imposed may be enforced; and it is not
self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of
which those principles may be given the force of law.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
120 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3 (Treason Clause); id. at art. IV, § 2 (Extradition Clause) ("A
Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice,
and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the Executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.").
121 There were scattered treason prosecutions by states prior to ratification of the Con-
stitution, but they are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Respublica v. Carlisle, I U.S. 35
(1778) (treason against Pennsylvania); Respublica v. Roberts, I U.S. 39 (1778) (same).
122 The Trial of Thomas Wilson Dorr for Treason, Rhode Island, 1844, in 2 AMERICAN STATE
TRIALS 5 (Lawson ed. 1914); The Trial of John Brown for Treason and Insurrection, Charlestown,
Virginia, 1859, in 6 AMERICAN STATES TRIALS 700 (Lawson ed. 1916).
123 See 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note iz, at 12-I3; 6 AMERICAN STATES TRIALS
700 supra note 122 at 8oo.
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1. The Trial of Thomas Wilson Dornr-Following the revolution of 1776, most
of the colonies adopted written constitutions, but Rhode Island opted to
maintain the original charters granted by England."2 4 Beginning in 1777
and continuing throughout the early nineteenth century, the majority of
citizens in Rhode Island advocated for a written constitution, but each
time, the Rhode Island General Assembly refused to call a constitutional
convention."2 5 Due to this consistent roadblock, "the people began to see
clearly that the only remedy they had was to ignore the General Assembly
and to proceed to form a new constitution independently of it."' 6 Thomas
Wilson Dorr became the leader of the movement to bypass the General
Assembly and form a written constitution.127
Dorr and his supporters formed the "Rhode Island Suffrage Convoca-
tion," which pursued a "peaceful revolution-.., by ignoring the constituted
authorities."'2 8 In 1841, they drafted a constitution and submitted it for a
state-wide vote, which passed, but was later invalidated by the state Su-
preme Court.2 9 In 1842, the General Assembly passed a law forbidding any-
one from attending meetings for the election of new state officers. 130 This
law declared it treason to hold high office in any newly formed government.
Undaunted, Dorr claimed his seat as governor in a newly formed govern-
ment. 13 1 A short time later, supporters of the original government called an
election of their own and elected Samuel King as governor. Thus, "[t]wo
rival Governors and General Assemblies were now in existence.""13
Dorr and his supporters thereafter led an attack on the state arsenal in
Providence in hopes of gaining possession of the state's military supplies.
13
The attack was doomed from the start. Dorr's supporters attempted to fire a
124 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 5.
125 Id. at 6. The original colonial charter, under which the General Assembly operated,
limited suffrage to white landowners and their oldest sons. This sufficed in the early days
of the colony, but as Rhode Island's population of artisans, tradespeople, and professionals
grew-many of whom did fit the category of people entitled to vote-so did the demand for
suffrage and a general discontent with the General Assembly. See id. at 5-6 n. I.
126 Id. at 6.
127 Id. at 5.
128 Id. at 7.
129- Id. at 8.
130 Act of April 4, 1842, § 3, 1842 R.I. Pub. Laws 14. According to AMERICAN STATE TRIALS
it was under this Act that Dorr was tried and convicted of treason. 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS,
supra note io9, at 9. But Dorr's alleged treason was for levying war against the state, and there-
fore he was likely charged under a different statute, which read as follows: "Treason against
this State shall consist only in levying war against the same, or in adhering to the enemies
thereof, giving them aid and comfort." Act of Jan. 1838, § 1, 1838 R.I. Pub. Laws 3.
131 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 9. In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849),
the Supreme Court refused to say which government was legitimate, finding instead that it
was a political question and therefore outside its purview. Id. at 42.
132 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 10.
133 Id.
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cannon but it had been doused in water and would not fire.'34 Dorr's forces
quickly fled the state.'35 Governor King, who by now had declared martial
law, issued a warrant for Dorr's arrest.'36 In August 1842, Dorr voluntarily
returned to the state and was tried for treason for levying war against the
state by leading an armed revolt in an attempt to establish himself as the
new governor.'37
At trial, Dorr argued that treason cannot be committed against a state.
In his opening statement, Dorr's counsel told the jury that his first defense
would be that, "in this country, treason is an offence against the United
States only, and cannot be committed against an individual state."' 38 The
court considered that to be a purely legal question that would be decided
by the court, not the jury.'39 The court therefore entertained the matter
through a motion outside the hearing of the jurors."4
Dorr's counsel began by outlining in broad strokes the history of trea-
son as an "offence against the sovereign power."'' The sovereign power,
according to the defense, is "the person who has the power of judging in
the last resort," and "there can be no sovereign where there are many sov-
134 Id. at Io-.I .
135 Id. at II.
136 Id. ("Thus ended the Dorr war. Only one man lost his life, a Massachusetts man on
Massachusetts soil, who was accidentally killed by a musket ball fired across the bridge.").
137 Id. As described by Chief Judge Durfee in his charge to the jury:
Each of these counts substantially charges, that the prisoner, being under the
protection of the laws of this State, and owing allegiance and fidelity to the said
State, not weighing the duty of his said allegiance, and traitorously devising and
intending to stir up, move and excite insurrection, rebellion, and war against the
said State, with force and arms, unlawfully and traitorously, did conspire, compass,
imagine, and intend to raise and levy war, insurrection, and rebellion against the
said State, and, in order to perfect, fulfill, and bring to effect the said compassings,
imaginations, and intents of him, the said Thomas Wilson Dorr, he,.. . with a great
multitude of persons, amounting to a great number, armed and arrayed in a warlike
manner, being then and there unlawfully, maliciously, and traitorously, assembled
and gathered together, did falsely and traitorously assemble and gather themselves
together against the said State, and then and there, with force and arms, did falsely
and traitorously, and in a warlike and hostile manner, array and dispose themselves
against the said State, and then and there, in pursuance of the said traitorous in-
tentions and purposes aforesaid, he, the said Thomas Wilson Dorr, with the said
persons so as aforesaid traitorously assembled and armed and arrayed, in manner
aforesaid most wickedly, maliciously, and traitorously did ordain, prepare, and levy
war against the said State, contrary to the duty of his said allegiance and fidelity,
against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the
peace and dignity of the State.
2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 1 22, at 156.
138 JOSEPH S. PITMAN, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THOMAS WILSON DORR FOR TREASON 67-
68 (Boston, Tappan & Dennet, 1844). The defense also argued that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion because the alleged overt acts of treason occurred outside the county in which Dorr was
tried, that Dorr was justified in acting as governor, and that the evidence did not support the
charge of treasonable intent. Id.
139 Id. at 77-
140 Id. at 78.
141 Id.
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ereigns, for there must be one person to judge in the last resort." 142 But in
this country, of course, the sovereign power resides not in a single person,
but in all the People, collectively. Thus, the defense reasoned that offenses
against the sovereign were offenses against the People of the United States
collectively, not offenses against the people of a single state. 143
The defense then drew distinctions between federal and state sov-
ereignty under the Constitution. "Ultimate sovereignty" resided in the
people of the United States, whereas states maintained a "qualified sover-
eignty" only.!" Although states were sovereign in certain areas, the United
States retained ultimate sovereignty in the realm of punishing offenses
against the body politic. Thus, according to the defense, the power to de-
fine and punish treason was among the attributes of sovereignty that the
states ceded to the national government.1
45
In response, the prosecution conceded two of Dorr's premises; namely,
that treason can only be committed against the sovereign power, and that
that power in this country resides with the people.146 Still, the prosecution
argued, these concessions by no means led to the conclusions advanced by
the defense. The prosecution chided the defense, saying, "I had always
supposed that the people of this State were the sovereign power of the
State, and I never, until now, heard the doctrine suggested, that the sover-
eign power of this State, resided in the people of the United States." 147 The
government of the United States, rather, is a "union of sovereignties."148
Moreover, "the right of self-protection and preservation" is inherent in the
principle of sovereignty, and nowhere does the Constitution suggest that
the states gave up that right by entering the Union. 149 The prosecution also
looked to the Constitutional Convention debates, the text of the Constitu-
tion, the practice among the states of criminalizing treason, and a majority
of treatise writers.150
The prosecution concluded its presentation with a reference to Justice
Joseph Story's charge to a federal grand jury in Rhode Island in 1842.' 1' In
his charge, Justice Story distinguished between treason against the United
142 Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
143 Id. at 79-80.
144 JOSEPH S. PITMAN, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THOMAS WILSON DORR FOR TREASON 8o
(Boston, Tappan & Dennet 1844).
145 Id. at 8i.
146 Id. at 8z.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 83.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 83-84 ("The opinion of Mr. Justice Story, delivered here, in this very hall,
fully sustains the doctrine for which we contend, and enforces it in clear, cogent, and logical
terms.").
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States and treason against a state, a distinction based on intent and the fo-
cus of the overt acts. According to Justice Story, an act of war aimed at the
sovereignty of a particular state-by, for example, attempting to overturn
the state government or constitution, prevent the exercise of sovereign
powers, or resist execution of valid laws-is treason against the state, and
against the state only.' But Story also noted that an overt act, although ini-
tially aimed against state authorities, could be "mixed up or merged" into
treason against the United States and thereby become a federal crime.'53
The case against Dorr, according to the prosecution, fell squarely within
the class of treasonous acts aimed solely at the state, acts that did not impli-
cate the federal sovereign.154
The court sided with the prosecution, reasoning that "wherever alle-
giance is due, there treason may be committed."' 5 Because states demand
allegiance of their citizens, "treason may be committed against a State of
this Union."' 56 As to the meaning of sovereignty within the federal system,
the court implied that the sovereign power retained by the states included
the power to protect itself through treason laws. "The power to provide for
the punishment of this crime, the Legislature derives, not from the United
States, or the people thereof, but from our own people, from the organized
sovereign people of the State."' 57
The court also noted that its conclusion was consistent with the result of
the debates in the Constitutional Convention, the text of the Constitution,
comments by other state courts, commentators on the law, and the practice
of other state legislatures.'58 Taking these points together, the court held
152 Charge to Grand Jury, 30 E Cas. 1046, 1047 (C.C.D.R.I. 1842) (Case No. 18,275).
153 Id. Justice Story stated, in relevant part, as follows:
[TIreason may be begun against a state, and may be mixed up or merged in treason
against the United States. Thus, if the treasonable purpose be to overthrow the
government of the state, and forcibly to withdraw it from the Union, and thereby to
prevent the exercise of the national sovereignty within the limits of the state, that
would be treason against the United States. So, if the troops of the United States
should be called out by the president, in pursuance of the duty enjoined by the
constitution,... to protect-the state against domestic violence, and there should be
an assembly of persons with force to resist and oppose the troops so called out by
the president, that would be a levy of war against the United States, although the
primary intention of the insurgents may have been only the overthrow of the state
government or the state laws.
Id.
154 PITMAN, supra note 144, at 83-84.
155 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 153.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 155.
158 Id. at 154-55. The court's textual argument was based on Article IV, § 2. U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 3 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason."). Nei-
ther the parties' arguments nor the court's decision cite to other state-court decisions, so it
is unclear what other state courts are referred to. As to the practice of other states, the court
stated that eleven out of twenty-six states had constitutional or statutory provisions defining
and punishing the crime. As to the remaining fifteen states, "[t]he probability is, that, if they
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that Rhode Island's statute against treason was "constitutional and binding
on all, and that the sovereign authority of this State is such, that treason can
be committed against it."'151
The court that tried Dorr consisted of the same Supreme Court judges
who had previously ruled against the legality of the Dorr movement, and
there was not a single "Dorrite" on the jury."6 The jury quickly convicted
Dorr and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment.' Within one year
of his incarceration, however, with public opinion firmly in Dorr's corner,
the General Assembly passed a law releasing Dorr from prison.16
2. The Trial of John Brown.-The story of John Brown's raid on Harper's
Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia) is a fixture in American history and has
been well chronicled. 163 John Brown was an anti-slavery activist with a his-
tory of violence and biting rhetoric.' 64 On October 16, 1859, Brown led a
group of twenty-one men across the Potomac River from Maryland to Vir-
ginia. 165 Brown's goal was to incite southern slaves to abandon their homes,
join his band, and wage open warfare over the issue of slavery.166 Brown
and his men descended on Harper's Ferry, took possession of the United
States armory, and captured several prominent citizens.' 67 Brown and his
hostages were driven into the town's engine house, and after a short-lived
standoff that included "much firing from both sides," federal troops under
the command of Robert E. Lee broke down the door of the engine house
and crippled Brown with a sword.'68
Virginia indicted Brown for treason by levying war, conspiring to induce
slaves into insurrection, and murder.169 His trial began on October 21, 1859,
were examined, we should find ... that the whole twenty-six, have defined this crime, and
made provision for the punishment of it." 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 155.
159 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 155.
i6o Id. at I2.
I61 Id. at i64, 170.
162 Id. at 14;seealsoAct of June 1845, I845 R.I. Pub. Laws ii-I3.
163 For a narrative of John Brown's raid and subsequent trial for treason, see, e.g., Steven
Lubet, John Brown's Tial, 52 ALA. L. REV. 425 (2001). For a more detailed look, see BRIAN
McGINTY, JOHN BROWN'S TRIAL (Harvard University Press 2oo9).
164 6 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 700 n.2 (Brown was "very hostile to all
slave owners. He denounced slavery in language fierce and bitter, declaring that slave holders
had forfeited their right to live, and that the slaves had the right to resort to any means to rid
themselves of their masters and gain their liberty.").
165 Id. at 7oo-0i, n.3.
166 Id. at 703.
167 Id. at 703-04, n.2.
168 Id. at 706-07.
169 Id. at 723-24. The indictment on the treason account reads, in relevant part, as fol-
lows:
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less than a week after the raid.'7 ° Brown's trial drew national attention and
quickly became a referendum on slavery and the abolitionist movement,
with powerful interests and voices on both sides. Virginia's prosecution was
about more than treason; it was a public defense of slavery.171
Brown's trial raised several significant issues relating to treason against a
state. Brown's legal team mounted a multi-pronged defense. They argued
that Brown lacked treasonous intent.7 Brown was painted as an idealistic
renegade whose intent was to free the slaves, not to overthrow the state
government.'73 The defense also attacked the indictment because it failed
to charge Brown as a citizen of Virginia. According to Brown's lawyers, "no
man is guilty of treason, unless he be a citizen of the State of Government
against which the treason so alleged has been committed." '174 Thus, be-
cause Brown was not a Virginian, he "was not bound by any allegiance to
this State, and could not, therefore, be guilty of rebellion against it." 75 The
defense also argued that, if treason were proved, it must only be treason
against the United States because Brown and his band "were rather guilty
of resisting Colonel Lee, which was resistance to the Federal Government,
and not to the Commonwealth."17
The Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia.... upon their oaths do pres-
ent that John Brown .... together with divers other evil-minded and traitorous
persons to the jurors unknown, not having the fear of God before their eyes, but
being moved and seduced by the false and malignant counsel of other evil and
traitorous persons and the instigations of the devil, did severally, on the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth days of the month of October, in the year of our Lord
eighteen hundred and fifty-nine, and on divers other days before and after that
time, within the Commonwealth of Virginia.... feloniously and traitorously make
rebellion and levy war against the said Commonwealth of Virginia ....
Id. at 724, n.28.
170 Id. at 708.
171 Lubet, supra note 163, at 437 ("In brief, Governor Wise's decision to charge treason
in a Commonwealth court transformed John Brown's trial into something very much like a ref-
erendum on the unity ofthe nation.... Prosecution in federal court would have carried with it
at least a veneer of regional neutrality, but the Virginia proceeding made it clear that the case
against John Brown was also intended as a defense of slavery itself.") (citations omitted); see
also McGINTY, supra note 163, at 287 ("Viewed in the long lens of history, it is clear that John
Brown was not really on trial in Charleston. Slavery was.").
172 Id. at 769 (Brown's lawyer stating that "[w]e hope to prove the absence of malicious
intention.").
173 Id. at 782-85. Brown's lawyer did not dispute the facts, only their implications:
These men, it appears, assembled at a certain place, as the defendant himself in-
deed admits they did, and from that admission he does not shrink, for the purpose
of running away with slaves. That is a crime, and for that crime he is amenable to
the laws of your State, and for which you can punish him to the extent of that law.
Id. at 782.
174 Id. at 782.
175 Id.; see also id. at 792 (Brown's lawyer arguing that "treason could not be committed
against a Commonwealth except by a citizen thereof.").
176 Id. at 793.
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The court rejected each of these arguments. Most of the attention fo-
cused on the argument that only citizens owing allegiance to a state could
be guilty of treason. The prosecution responded that treason did not re-
quire citizenship. Instead, any person residing in the state, even temporar-
ily, owed allegiance to the state. Under this view, "when [Brown] came to
Virginia and planted his feet on Harper's Ferry, he came there to reside and
hold the place permanently."' 77 Following the closing arguments, Brown's
counsel requested a jury instruction that "if they believed the prisoner
was not a citizen of Virginia, but of another State, that they cannot convict
on a count of treason," but the court refused.' The jury deliberated for
only forty-five minutes, after which they pronounced Brown guilty on all
counts, and the court sentenced him to death by hanging.'79
Curiously, at no point leading up to or during trial did Brown's defense
team argue that treason cannot be committed against a state. Surely the ex-
perience from Dorr's trial should have at least alerted them to the argument.
After the trial, however, the defense did attempt to argue for the first time
that treason could not be committed against a state. 80 Following the jury
verdict, the defense immediately made a motion to arrest the judgment. 8'
The next day, the court "hear[d] ... the motion in the Brown case, which
was argued at length by counsel on both sides."'' l8 The existing records,
unfortunately, provide little detail about the substance of those arguments.
One record indicates that two additional lawyers arrived from Boston on
that day, so perhaps they advanced the strategy of attacking the verdict
from a new angle. i 3 The defense, citing writings by Justice Story, argued
that "treason could not be committed against a state, but only against the
[federal] government."' 1 4 It is not clear which writings of Justice Story's
were cited, although the most likely candidate is his influential Commentar-
ies on the Constitution, published in 1833, in which he casts mild doubt on
the notion that state treason can exist independently of treason against the
United States. 8 s Whatever the precise argument, it did not persuade the
177 Id. at 797 (alteration in original).
178 Id. at 799.
179 6 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 799-800, 802.
I8o Id. at 8oo.
i81 Id. A motion to arrest judgment was a procedural device in Virginia to challenge rul-
ings made during the trial. The motion was made before the sentence was passed to give the
court a chance to fix correctable errors or, if necessary, vacate the judgment and order a new
trial. See McGINTY, supra note 164, at 218.
I82 6 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 8oo.
183 THE LIFE, TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN JOHN BROWN 94 (New York, Robert M.
DeWitt 1859). The Boston lawyers arrived to assist in the defense of Edwin Coppie, Brown's
lieutenant, who was tried immediately after Brown's conviction. Id.
184 McGINTY, supra note 164, at 219.
185 See STORY, supra note 87 , at 173 ("The power of punishing the crime of treason
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court. "On the objection that treason cannot be committed against a State,"
the court ruled, "wherever allegiance is due, treason may be committed.
Most of the States have passed laws against treason."'8 6
3. Other State Treason Cases that were Dismissed or Abandoned Before Trial.-
Several other cases deserve mention although they were dismissed on le-
gal grounds or otherwise abandoned prior to trial. Moving in chronological
order, the first is People v. Lynch.'87 During the War of 1812, Mark Lynch,
Aspinwall Cornell, and John Hagerman provided food and supplies to Brit-
ish ships. 8 The State of New York indicted the men for treason by adher-
ing to the state's enemies at a time of open war between the United States
and Great Britain.'89 But the court dismissed the indictment because the
acts charged did not amount to treason against the state.19° This conclusion
flowed from the fact that the United States, not the State of New York, had
declared war against Great Britain, and therefore the British soldiers who
had received food and supplies at the defendants' hands were not enemies
of the State of New York:
Great Britain cannot be said to be at war with the state of New-
York, in its aggregate and political capacity, as an independent
government, and therefore, not an enemy of the state, within
the sense and meaning of the statute. The people of this state,
as citizens of the United States, are at war with Great Britain, in
consequence of the declaration of war by Congress. The state,
in its political capacity, is not at war. The subjects of Great
against the United States is exclusive in congress; and the trial of the offence belongs exclu-
sively to the tribunals appointed by them. A state cannot take cognizance, or punish the of-
fence; whatever it may do in relation to the offence of treason, committed exclusively against
itself, if indeed any can case can, under the constitution, exist, which is not at the same time treason
against the United States.") (emphasis added). However, as we have already seen, Justice
Story's view of state treason, as expressed in his charge to a federal grand jury in Rhode Island,
contemplates that state treason may exist in narrow circumstances. See Charge to Grand Jury,
30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (C.C.D.R.I. 1842) (Case No. 18,275).
186 6 AMERICAN STATE TIRIALS, supra note 122, at 800.
187 People v. Lynch, i i Johns. 549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814).
188 Id. at 552.
189 The court described the indictment as follows:
The indictment, containing several counts which are substantially alike, after set-
ting out a state of war between the United States and Great Britain, declared and
carried on under the authority of the United States, alleges, that the prisoners, being
citizens of the state of Ne--York, and of the United States of America, as traitors
against thepeople ofthe state of Ner-York, did adhere to, and give aid and comfort to
the enemy, by supplying them with provisions of various kinds, on board a public
ship of war, upon the seas.
Id. at 552.
19o Id. at 553.
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Britain are the enemies of the United States of America, and the
-citizens thereof, as members of the union, and not of the state
of New-York, as is laid in the indictment.... [A]dmitting the
facts charged against the prisoners amount to treason against
the United States, they do not constitute the offen[s]e of treason
against the people of the state of New-York, as charged in the
indictment. 191
Thus, although the defendants had breached their allegiance in provid-
ing aid and support to British troops, it was a breach of their allegiance to
the United States, which was not actionable in state court. 9 ' According to
the Lynch court, "the jurisdiction of the state courts does not extend to the
offen[s]e of treason against the United States."'93
It is tempting to read Lynch broadly for the proposition that treason can-
not be committed against a state.' 4 But such a broad reading is not sup-
portable. The court in Lynch was careful to limit its holding to the facts
of that case, viz, an indictment for treason by adhering to the enemy dur-
ing a time when the United States had declared war on a foreign power.
The court explicitly noted that "there can be no doubt but such a state of
things might exist, as that treason against the people of this state might be
committed."'95 The court even provided examples of the kind of conduct
that might amount to state treason:
This might be, by an opened and armed opposition to the laws
of the state, or a combination and forcible attempt to overturn
or usurp the government. And, indeed, the state, in its political
capacity, may, under certain special circumstances, pointed out
by the constitution of the United States, be engaged in war with
a foreign enemy.196
Next are two cases instituted by different states but directed at the
same individual: Joseph Smith, the founder of the Church of Jesus Christ
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 553-54.
194 At least one writer has read Lynch broadly for the proposition that treason cannot be
committed against a state. See Gordon A. Madsen, Joseph Smith and the Missouri Court of Inquiry,
43:4 BYU STUD. Q. 113-15, 120 (2oo4), available at https://byustudies.byu.edu/showTitle.
aspx?title=69o5 (examining charges against Joseph Smith for treason by levying war against
Missouri and concluding, based on Lynch, that "treason can only be committed against the
United States, not against an individual state, as clarified by the Lynch case in 1814").
195 Lynch, i i Johns at 552-53.
196 Id. at 553. Regarding the court's assessment that a state may in limited circumstances
be involved in a war with a foreign enemy, see infra note 325 and accompanying text.
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of Latter-Day Saints (the "Mormons"). Smith faced treason charges twice,
once by the State of Missouri in 1838, and again by the State of Illinois in
1844.197
Mormon settlers arrived in Jackson County, Missouri, in 1831.198 With-
in a few years, to counter the Mormons' increasing influence, prominent
members of the County entered a "secret constitution" or "Manifesto of
the Mob," which endorsed vigilantism and aimed to expel the Mormons
from the County.199 The Mormons were forced from Jackson County and
settled in nearby counties. The friction, however, did not cease. Non-Mor-
mons in the new locales distrusted and persecuted the Mormons, largely
due to their religious beliefs. 00 The Mormons began to fight back. When
Governor Lilburn Boggs learned that the Mormons had taken up arms, he
directed the state militia to treat the Mormons as enemies who "must be
exterminated or driven from the state, if necessary for the public good. '01
Several days later, eighteen or nineteen Mormons were killed in a mas-
sacre at Haun's Mill, Caldwell County.102 Smith and other Mormon lead-
ers were arrested and, after a preliminary examination by Judge Austin A.
King, bound over on charges of treason and other crimes. 2 3 Before a formal
trial occurred, however, the prisoners escaped-probably with the conniv-
ance of the jailors-and fled to Illinois."°
In Illinois, the Mormons founded a new city called Nauvoo. With the
Missouri difficulties still fresh, the Mormons distrusted state authority and
sought to build a society based on autonomy and self-sufficiency.0 5 In
1840, the Illinois legislature granted Nauvoo a city charter that, by today's
standards, gave extraordinary powers to the city, including the power to
keep its own militia and grant writs of habeas corpus.2° Legal historians
Edwin Brown Firmage and Richard Collin Mangrum note that the citizens
of Illinois viewed the Mormons' assumption of broad authority under the
city charter as a "Mormon attempt[] to create a sovereign political body
under the federal system, distinct from the state of Illinois." 0'
197 See EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS 63-79
(Missouri charges) and 113-120 (Illinois charges) (University of Illinois Press 1988).
198 Id. at 63.
I99 Id.
200 td. at 70.
201 Id. at 74.
202 Id.
203 FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 197 at 74-76.
204 See id. at 77.
205 See id. at 83.
2o6 See id. at 84-85.
207 Id. at 99. The authors also note that the powers granted under the city charter were
not unusual for the time period. See id. at 85-86.
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Although many factors contributed to friction between the Mormons
and the citizens of Illinois, public sentiment against the Mormons exploded.
when the Nauvoo city council passed a resolution calling for the destruc-
tion of a libelous press.1 °8 Destruction of the press infuriated non-Mor-
mons who viewed the move as a willful disregard of state laws.2°9 Smith and
other Mormon leaders were charged with riot, but fearing for their safety,
they initially refused to leave Nauvoo to answer the charges. 210 With attack
impending on Nauvoo, Smith declared martial law and called out the city's
militia. The act of calling out the militia led to treason charges, even though
no shots were fired and Smith later urged the Mormons to surrender their
arms to state authorities. " ' Before Smith could answer.the treason charges,
a vigilante mob stormed the jail where he and his brother Hyrum Smith
were being held and killed them both.2
12
Speaking about the Missouri and Illinois charges, Professor Hurst con-
cludes that charging the Mormon leaders with treason was "severe" and
that "it seems likely that on a fair trial a limited purpose of self-defense,
rather than intent to set up a rival government, could have been made
out. '2 13 In addition to self-defense, the charges against Smith likely would
have failed due to a lack of treasonous intent and other legal deficiencies.
214
In short, the story of the Mormons in Missouri and Illinois is one of mu-
2o8 See id. at io6-i13. Firmage and Mangrum conclude that the destruction of the press
"was the death-knell for the legal sanctuary the Mormons had created in Nauvoo." Id. at 113.
209 DALLIN H. OAKS & MARVIN S. HILL, CARTHAGE CONSPIRACY 15 (University of Illinois
Press 1975).
210 Id. at 15-16.
211 Seeid. at 16-18.
212 Id. at 2o-21.
213 Treason III, supra note 19, at 849, app. I (citing various sources on Smith's arrests in Il-
linois and Missouri). Years after Smith's death, Illinois Governor Thomas Ford acknowledged
the dubious nature of the Illinois treason charges. He wrote: "If [the Mormons'] opponents
had been seeking to put the law in force in good faith, and nothing more, then an array of a
military force in open resistance to the posse comitatus and the militia of the State, most prob-
ably would have amounted to treason. But if those opponents merely intended to use the
process of the law.., as cats-paws to compass the possessions of their persons for the purpose
of murdering them afterwards, as the sequel demonstrated the fact to be, it might well be
doubted whether they were guilty of treason." THOMAS FORD, HISTORY OF ILLINOIS 337 (Chi-
cago, S.C. Griggs & Co. 1854).
214 See Madsen, supra note 194, at 119-20 (cbncluding that the Missouri charges suffered
from numerous legal defects, including a disregard for statutorily mandated minimums of due
process, lack of an overt act to levy war, the alleged acts of treason occurred outside the county
in which Smith was charged, and the violation of the two-witness rule required for each overt
act of treason); see also 3 HISTORY OF "IIE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
277-81 (B.H. Roberts, ed., 1974) (containing text of a petition to the Missouri Supreme Court
arguing that Smith was imprisoned on false testimony, did not levy war against the state, did
not commit any overt acts, and other points).
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tual recrimination and distrust on the edges of the American frontier, not
treason.
Another important case that was dismissed on legal grounds prior to trial
is Exparte Quarier15 The issue was whether William Quarrier, a southern
lawyer who had voted for secession and entered into military service for
the Confederate States, should be admitted to practice law in West Virginia.
At the conclusion of the Civil War, Quarrier took the amnesty oath and re-
ceived a presidential pardon.116 When Quarrier sought admission to the bar
of the newly made State of West Virginia, the State argued that Quarrier's
former treason against the United States disqualified him from practicing
law because a felony disqualified a lawyer from practicing in the state." 7
The State argued that "the war being waged against the United States, of
which the State of West Virginia was one, was...waged against her in the
sense contemplated in the statute against treason, and therefore, the acts in
question were treason against the State .... 11118
The court rejected this reasoning, holding instead that treason against
the United States, for which Quarrier had been pardoned, could not be
merged into treason against the State. Rather, to qualify as treason against
the State, the act must be directed at the State specifically:
[T]o constitute treason against the State, it is not enough to
wage war against the United States generally or collectively, or
as component parts of the national Union, but it must be done
directly against the State, in particular, by invading her territory,
attacking her citizens, subverting her government and laws, or
attempting her destruction by force .... 19
Another case, Pennsylvania v. O'Donnell, sprang out of the 1892 Home-
stead riots in Pennsylvania.2 0 The case started as a labor dispute over wag-
es between the Carnegie Steel Company and some of its employees. When
negotiations broke down, employees organized a strike and "arranged and
perfected an organization of military character. '2' The military organiza-
tion surrounded the steel mill with armed men.2 Carnegie Steel sought
help from the county sheriff, who, after attempting to provide protection,
215 Exparte Quarrier, 2W. Va. 569 (1866).
216 Id. at 569-70.
217 Id. at 570-71.
218 Id. at 572.
2i9 Id.
220 "The Homestead Case," i Pa. D. 785 (Pa. 0. &T Oct. 1892)
221 See id. at 786-87.
222 Id. at 787.
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was driven off by threats of violence.2 3 Skirmishes broke out, some were
killed on both sides, and eventually the governor called out the state militia
to restore order.
224
The state sought indictments against the leaders of the strike for trea-
son.22 5 Edward Paxson, the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, personally charged the grand jurors. "You will [ I observe," he told
the jurors, "that the offence charged is treason against this state, and not
the United States; it is a matter with which the latter have nothing to do,
and over which its courts have no jurisdiction. 2 2 6 Then, taking a broad
view of treason, Justice Paxson instructed the grand jurors as follows:
[W]hen a large number of men arm and organize themselves
by divisions and companies, appoint officers, and engage in a
common purpose to defy the law, to resist its officers, and to de-
prive any portion of their fellow-citizens of the rights to which
they are entitled under the constitution and laws, it is a levying
of war against the state, and the offense is treason.2 7
Several leaders were indicted, but the indictments were later quietly
dropped.2 8 Justice Paxson's charge was roundly criticized as an example of
overbroad application of treason laws.1
2 9
Following O'Donnell, state courts were silent on the topic of state treason
for over fifty years. Not until 1954 would another state court wade into state
treason, and even then the court's discussion was collateral to the issue un-
der review. In Ohio v. Raley,230 three defendants were separately indicted for
contempt of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission (the "Commis-
sion"). After having been sworn as witnesses before the Commission, the
defendants each refused to testify in response to certain questions.23" ' The
defendants fought the charges by attacking the legitimacy of the Commis-
sion, arguing, among other things, that in creating a Commission to investi-
gate persons or groups suspected of subversive activities against Ohio and
the United States, the state legislature had "invaded a field of government
223 id.
224 Id. at 787-88.
225 Id. at 786.
226 Id. at 786-90.
227 See id. at 790.
228 Treason III, supra note 19, at 823-24.
229 Id. at 824 ("Significantly, the treason charge met with prompt and unanimous criti-
cism from conservative professional sources.").
230 Ohio v. Raley, 136 N.E.2d 295, 302 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1954), vacatedby Morgan v. Ohio,
354 U.S. 929 (i957), adhering toformerjudgment in Ohio v. Morgan, 147 N.E.2d 847 (I957), affd
in part and rev'd in part by Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
231 Id.
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in which the United States government [had] paramount authority under
the Constitution of the United States [.] ' ' 23z
In analyzing the Commission's authority to investigate subversive ac-
tivities against both sovereigns, the court rejected the implication in the
defendants' argument that treason could not be committed against a state.
The court reasoned that the authority to guard against sedition and treason
was not among the aspects of sovereignty transferred to the United States:
We think it is also implied that there is no such thing as sedi-
tion or treason against an individual state. We cannot agree with
either of these claims. Sedition and treason against the United
States as a sovereign entity are necessarily offenses also against
every sovereign state of the federal Union. Their relation to one
another is fixed by the United States Constitution, which, by its
terms, makes the United States government, within its domain,
paramount. However, it leaves the states paramount sovereigns
in all governmental matters not transferred to the United States
government. 33
Thus, when viewed through the lens of dual sovereigns, "[t]hat sedition
and treason are proper subjects of state action, there can be no doubt."134
Several important lessons and conclusions can be drawn from these
state treason cases. First, no court has held that states lack the power to
define and punish treason. In fact, to date, all of the cases do the oppo-
site by endorsing state treason. Dorr and Brown explicitly hold that state
treason is a valid exercise of state power, and the others do so implicitly.35
Second, nearly all of the treason prosecutions at the state level have dealt
with allegations of treason by levying war against the state. Only one case,
Lynch, involved treason for adhering to the state's enemies. Third, several
cases, most notably Lynch and Quarrier, acknowledge that state laws cannot
reach conduct aimed against the United States. 36 Finally, we see in at least
two cases-the case against the Mormon leaders and the case following
the Homestead riots-unfortunate examples of how a state's treason law
232 Id. at 304.
233 Id. at 305.
234 Id. at 306.
235 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122; 6 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122.
236 People v. Lynch, I I Johns. 549, 553-54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814); Exparte Quarrier, 2 W.Va.
569,572 (1866).
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can be applied broadly as a tool against religious minorities or political op-
ponents.
37
B. The Scholarly Debate over State Treason
For the founding generation, there seems to have been little doubt that
states could punish treason. In his famous lectures to students at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, for example, James Wilson lectured at length on
"treason against the United States, and against the state of Pennsylvania."' 38
Other commentators from that early time period agreed that states could
criminalize the offense. 39
By the early nineteenth century, some commentators had started to
preach that state treason was impossible. Edward Livingston is the most
notable example. In 1821, the Louisiana General Assembly appointed Liv-
ingston to draft a criminal code."4 Livingston omitted the crime of treason
from his draft code, explaining that "from the nature of the federal union,
a levy of war against one member of the union is a levy of war against the
whole; therefore it is concluded, that treason against the state, being trea-
son against the United States, it is to be punished under their laws and in
their courts."24 ' Although Livingston's draft code was widely praised by
scholars in this country and in Europe, it was never formally adopted by the
Louisiana legislature. 2 Still, Livingston's purposeful omission of a provi-
sion on treason reflects the view of one of the early nineteenth century's
best legal minds.
The debate over state treason lasted throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury. Some commentators held that the states could define and punish trea-
son2 43 while others held that treason was a crime left solely to the United
237 See FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 197.
238 3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 95 (Bird Wilson, ed.,
Philadelphia, Bronson and Chauncey 18o4) (emphasis added).
239 See, e.g., 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFER-
ENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; AND OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF VIRGINIA 76-92, n.I-I9 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch and Abraham Small
1803) (discussing application of law of treason against the United States and the Common-
wealth of Virginia).
240 1 EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE 4 (New York, National Prison Association of the United States of America
1873).
241 Id. at 245.
242 See Eugene Smith, Edward Livingston, and the Louisiana Codes, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 24,
35-36 (1902).
243 See, e.g., I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 82 (Boston,
Little, Brown, and Co., 4 th ed., 1868) ("Treason ... is a crime against either the United
States or an individual State, according as it aims at the subjugation of the one government
or the other."); id. at 524 (stating summarily that "[iun this country, treason is either against
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States.2" The debate continued through the middle of the nineteenth
century. Chancellor James Kent, in the 1848 edition of his influential Com-
mentaries on American Law, noted that it was "a question of grave discussion
how far treason might be committed against one of the United States sepa-
rately considered."' 4 And Timothy Walker, founder of the University of
Cincinnati Law School, stated in his 1860 edition of Introduction to American
Law that "the point has never been definitely settled, and is one of no smalldifficulty.' ' "4
The most thorough discussion of state treason appeared in 1845 when
the American Law Magazine published an article analyzing the contours of
state treason by levying war. 47 The article made a compelling constitu-
tional case for limiting state treason laws. It started by reading together two
the United States or a particular State"); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 306 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825) ("Similar acts
committed against the laws or government of a particular state, are punishable according to
the laws of that state, but do not amount to treason against the United States."); WILLIAM C.
ROBINSON, ELEMENTARY LAW 254 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1882) ("Treason against an
individual State, in the absence of Constitutional or statutory provision, is an offence at com-
mon law, and is so recognized in the Constitution of the United States. Like treason against
the United States, it consists only in levying war against the State, or in adhering to the pub-
lic enemy."); 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 618-19
(Henry St. George Tucker, ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1899) ("[The Treason Clause] de-
fines only treason against the United States. Treason against a State is left to its own definition.
... [Article IV, sec. 2] clearly refers to a treason against a State, of which it alone could have
jurisdiction.").
244 See, e.g., ISRAEL WARD ANDREWS, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 225 (New York, Van Antwerp, Bragg & Co. 1874) ("As treason is a crime against sov-
ereignty, a violation of one's allegiance, there can be no treason against a particular State. If
a State, by its Courts, punishes treason, it must be not as treason against itself, but as treason
against the Union; and in this view the propriety of that State legislation which affixes to it
particular penalties is doubtful."); JOEL ALEXANDER JAMESON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION; ITS HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 56 (New York, Charles Scribner and
Co. 1867) ("Treason is a crime against sovereignty, a violation of one's allegiance. Hence,
there really is no such thing as treason against any political body in the Union but the United
States. If a State, by its courts, punishes treason, it must be not as treason against itself, but
as treason against the Union; and, in this view, the propriety of that State legislation which
defines treason against the State and affixes to it particular penalties, is doubtful."); I TIMOTHY
WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW DESIGNED AS A FIRST BOOK FOR STUDENTS 535 (Bos-
ton, Little, Brown, and Co., 4th ed. 186o) ("We have before seen that is questionable whether
treason may not also be a State crime. Many of the States so regard it, and make provision for
its punishment .... But it is evident that to make treason a State crime, there must be some
different definition; because each State being a part of the United States, the acts embraced
in the foregoing definition, though committed against a single State, would still be treason
against the United States.").
245 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 403 n.a (New York, William Kent,
6th ed. 1848).
246 WALKER, supra note 244, at 154.
247 Can the Crime of Treason Be Committed Against One of the United States?, 4 AM. L. MAG.
318 (1845).
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provisions of the Constitution. Reading the language of Article I, § 8, and
Article IV, § 4, the authors noted that Congress has the exclusive power
"to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions;" as well as the duty to "guarantee to every state in the Union a
republican form of government, and to protect each of them against inva-
sion and against domestic violence."148 It follows, the authors argued, that
the sovereign power of the United States includes the obligation to protect
the states in cases of war, domestic violence, or invasion. Under this consti-
tutional framework, it impossible to levy war against a single state without
making the United States a party to that war:
Whenever a war is levied against the people of a state, the Unit-
ed States are of necessity a party to that war, and if they who
levy war, owe allegiance to the United States, they are guilty of
treason....
If the rebels are traitors to a state, they are also traitors to the
United States; and all the evil consequences of the crime affect
the general government, and not merely the state sovereignty. 49
Still, not all state treason laws are forbidden under this reasoning. The
article argued that whether acts of treason against a state merged into trea-
son against the United States depended on intent. If the intent were to
subvert and overthrow the state government, overt acts in pursuit of such
intent constituted treason against the United States because the federal
government would be obligated to come to the state's defense.5 0 But if
force were levied with the general intent of opposing the laws of the state
but not overthrowing the state government, such acts would not implicate
the federal government, and the crime would be treason against the state
only. 5' Treason against a state might include violence aimed at intimidat-
ing the state government, controlling its operations, usurping its authority,
or resisting its laws.52
248 Id. at 319.
249 Id. at 319-20.
250 Id. at 329.
251 Id. at 33 L
252 Id. at 340, 347-48. Although never adopted by any court, some commentators found
the reasoning in American Law Magazine persuasive. Chancellor Kent wrote that "levying war
against one state is a levying of war against all in their federal capacity, and is a crime belong-
ing exclusively to the federal government." Then, citing the "able essay on this subject in
American Law Magazine," he concluded that "the limitation of treason against a state in its
distinct capacity, would seem to be confined to cases in which the open and armed opposition
to the laws is not accompanied with the intention of subverting the government." KENT, supra
2012-20][3]
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Although the debate over state treason never fully died, by the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, treatise writers generally agreed
that states had the power to define and punish treason in all its forms. In his
1880 edition of A Treatise On Criminal Law, Francis Wharton reviewed the
arguments for and against state treason. 53 After reviewing the opinions of
learned treatise writers, the limited case law, and the practice of the states,
Wharton concluded that state treason was a valid crime, a conclusion that
was "practically beyond doubt." '54 Other legal commentators in the same
time period agreed that the weight of authority favored the view that states
had the power to enact treason laws. 55
Over the course of the twentieth century, opinions on the issue gradu-
ally disappeared. Although there was a spike in interest in treason laws
following World War II, those cases largely dealt with treason against the
United States and did not discuss whether the crime existed vis-a-vis the
states. Treatise writers began giving less attention to the debate. Whereas
the early editions of Wharton's influential treatise on criminal law devoted
approximately ten pages to state treason, 5 6 the most recent edition, pub-
lished in 1996, reduces the issue to two short sentences: "Treason against
a state may also be committed. The state treason statutes closely resemble
the pertinent federal statute." '57 Today, most criminal treatises and text-
books do not even mention state treason laws. 5 8
note 245, at 403 n.(a).
253 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 551-55 (Philadelphia, Kay and
Brother, 8th ed. 188o).
254 Id. at 554.
255 See, e.g., 2 J. I. CLARK HARE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1230 (Boston, Little,
Brown, and Co. 1889) (noting that "the existence of a federal law rendering an offence crimi-
nal will not preclude the enactment of a similar statute by a State," a principle that allows for
state treason laws); 2 EMLIN MCCLAIN, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 535 (Chicago, Cal-
laghan & Co. 1897) ("It is entirely possible that the same act may constitute treason against
a state and also against the United States and be punishable as a crime by each, but no such
question has ever been discussed in the courts of last resort."); 2 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1230-31 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 191 o) (placing particular
emphasis on Lynch and Dorr after reviewing the arguments regarding state treason, noting that
those decisions "hold that there can be treason against a State of the Federal Union, and that
open and armed opposition to the laws of the State, or a combination and forcible attempt to
overturn or usurp the State government, giving aid and comfort to the enemies of a State or
supplying them with provision").
256 See, e.g., FRANCIS WHARTON, A TIREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
I0l1-IO (Philadelphia, Kay and Brother, 4th ed. 1857).
257 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 659 (15th ed. 1996).
258 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (5 th ed. 2010) (no references to treason).
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C. The Debate in State Legislatures
Not surprisingly, the debate over state treason was not limited to legal
commentators and treatise writers but spilled onto the floors of state legis-
latures as well. In 1868, for instance, legislators in South Carolina engaged
in a heated and lengthy debate over whether the state constitution should
contain a clause defining treason 59 The draft constitution contained a
treason clause, whereupon Mr. Mackey moved to strike it entirely, stating
that "[iut seems to me absurd to speak of treason against the State."6 0 He
continued: "I regard it as impossible to commit treason against South Caro-
lina. A citizen of this State can commit treason against the United States,
but he never can be guilty of treason towards South Carolina or any other
State.... I regard it just as impossible to commit treason against a State
as to commit treason against a city or a county.12 6 1 In support of the mo-
tion to strike the definition of treason, another legislator noted that South
Carolina was a "subordinate power," and "there can be no treason against a
subordinate power, but only against the supreme and sovereign power." 6 1
Those in favor of a treason clause pointed to the practice of other states,
as well as the Dorr and Brown examples. 63 In the end, those opposed to a
constitutional definition of state treason carried the day. By a vote of eighty
to twenty-six, the draft language was stricken."z
According to a commentator on Ohio law, the crime of treason was
dropped from Ohio's statutes in 1824: "... [Ilt seems to have occurred to the
general assembly, that treason against an individual state, under our federal
union, was a mere chimera, against which it was useless to legislate."' 65 The
commentator reasoned that "[iut would be seizing the lion of federal sover-
eignty by the mane, and that too in his very lair; for the right to declare the
punishment of treason is expressly delegated to Congress, by the federal
constitution." 6 Before too long, however, the Ohio legislature re-inserted
259 1 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, HELD AT CHARLESTON, S.C., BEGINNING JANU-
ARY 14TH AND ENDING MARCH 17TH, 1868, INCLUDING THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS 326-38
(Charleston, Denny & Perry 1868).
260 Id. at 326.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 328.
263 Id. at 328 (noting that "in most of the States a similar provision is inserted in their
Constitutions"); id. at 329,333 (discussing the example of John Brown); id. at 334-35 (discuss-
ing example of Thomas Dorr).
264 Id. at 338.
265 Acts of a General Nature, enacted, revised and ordered to be reprinted, at the first session
of the twenty-second General Assembly of the State of Ohio, begun and held at the town of Columbus,
December 1, 1823, and in the twenty-second year of said State, THE AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW,
Sept. I, 1831, at 29, 39.
266 Id.
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treason into penal laws. During a debate regarding revision of the state con-
stitution in 1851, one legislator questioned "the necessity of the provision
in relation to 'treason."' 67 The reply came that, although it may never be
needed, "if the section did no harm, why strike it out?"Z68
In 1854, a Maryland commission appointed to revise the state's rules
of practice reached a similar conclusion. Noting the division of opinions
on whether treason can be committed against a state, the commissioners'
notes state that "the better opinion seems to be, that levying war against
one State, is levying war against all, and is a crime belonging exclusively to
the general government."' 169 Still, the Maryland law providing for punish-
ment of the crime "will, in all probability, sleep quietly on the statute book
hereafter, as it has done heretofore," and "no great harm can be done, if
[the definition of the crime] should not be strictly correct." ' This willing-
ness to keep a treason law on the books regardless of its effectiveness or
necessity runs through many states' records. One commentator on Mon-
tana law, for example, noted that the State's current treason law is "more
historical than currently significant," "seems pointless," and "is of signifi-
cant theoretical value but of little or no practical value.12 1'
IV. THE VALIDITY OF STATE TREASON LAWS TODAY
Although discussion over state treason has largely vanished from mod-
ern legal discourse, the issue remains relevant. Forty-three states have
treason laws that, for the most part, have not changed since each state's re-
spective founding.72 The United States Supreme Court has never specifi-
267 CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, REPORT
OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OFTHE STATE OF OHIO 307 (Columbus, S. Medary 1851).
268 Id.
269 MARYLAND COMMISSIONERS TO REVISE, SIMPLIFY AND ABRIDGE THE RULES OF PRAC-
TICE, PLEADINGS, FORMS OF CONVEYANCING, AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURTS OF THIS STATE,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS TO REVISE, SIMPLIFY AND ABRIDGE THE RULES OF PRACTICE,
PLEADINGS, FORMS OF CONVEYANCING, AND PROCEEDINGS, OF THE COURTS OF THIS STATE 170
(Cumberland, W. Weber 1854).
270 Id. Other states debated the validity of state treason during this time period. See, e.g.,
I THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MICHIGAN, THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, CONVENED AT THE CITY OF LANSING,
WEDNESDAY, MAY 15TH, 1867, 346-47 (Lansing, John A Kerr & Co. 1867) (debating the motion
to strike treason from state constitution, which failed); 5 THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, HELD IN 1867 AND 1868, IN THE CITY OF ALBANY 3618 (Albany,
Weed, Parsons and Co. 1868) (debating a motion to strike reference to state treason in consti-
tutional provision relating to the governor's pardon power, which motion failed).
27 1 LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 82 (2001).
272 Supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
[Vol. IOI
TREASON AGAINST INDIVIDUAL STATES
cally decided or discussed the validity of state treason laws. 73 Might state
treason laws face constitutional challenge in the future, and if so, what is
the correct outcome?
Because each state that criminalizes treason does so based on the two
branches of treason contained in the Treason Clause, the analysis breaks
into two separate questions: One, is it possible to commit treason by "levy-
ing war" against an individual state? And two, is it possible to commit trea-
son by "adhering to the state's enemies, giving them aid and comfort"?
A. "Levying War" Against a State
With respect to levying war against a state, the arguments against such
a crime rest on simple and appealing logic: from the nature of the federal
Union, levying war against one member of the Union is a crime against the
whole. When disease strikes one internal organ, the entire body suffers; and
in like manner, an overt act of treason against one state is a crime against
them all. Because acts of war against one state threaten the cohesion and
sovereignty of the United States, it follows that such acts ought to be pun-
ished under its laws and in its courts. If it were otherwise, as the prescient
James Madison recognized, "the same act may be twice tried & punished
by the different authorities." "74
Moreover, by demanding that the federal government intervene in hos-
tilities against a state, the Guarantee Clause morphs acts of levying war
against a state into treason against the entire Union. Article IV, Section
4 provides that the United States "shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government," and shall protect the states
against invasion and, upon a state's request, against domestic violence. The
debates at the Constitutional Convention reveal the Framers' intent that
peaceful political processes would not trigger the President's obligation
under the Guarantee Clause; rather, the purpose was to protect the states
against the kind of insurrection and rebellion that might overturn state gov-
ernments and imperil the Union.7 ' Reviewing this history, Professor Hurst
concludes that "any effort by violence to deprive a state of a republican
form of government would undoubtedly involve conduct amounting to a
levying of war against the United States." '76 Justice Story reached the same
conclusion when he charged a jury that if the President called out troops
273 Exparte Dorr, 44 U.S. 103 (1845) (denying a writ of error on the grounds that the
law of the state, under which he was prosecuted, was repugnant to the federal constitution).
274 Supra note 60 and accompanying text.
275 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 47-49. For a summary of the debate history and its ties
to the Treason Clause, see Treason II, supra note 19, at 434-35.
276 Treason II, supra note 19, at 434 n. 169.
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to put down a rebellion against a state, "that would be a levy of war against
the United States."2
77
Notwithstanding the appeal of the above reasoning, the far better posi-
tion is that individual states may constitutionally define and punish trea-
son. This conclusion flows from the nature of state sovereignty in our fed-
eral system and bedrock principles of federal criminal jurisdiction. In short,
those who have argued against state treason rest their positions on unduly
grandiose conceptions of federal supremacy-conceptions that are not sup-
ported by the history or text of the Constitution.
Treason is a crime against sovereignty, and under the conventional Eng-
lish understanding, "sovereignty" referred to the indivisible, final, and un-
limited power that rested with a single individual or entity: the King and,
later, the King-in-Parliament. 78 But Americans had new and novel ideas
about sovereignty. Americans held that sovereignty resided not in an indi-
visible person or entity, but in the People collectively 79 Saying that the
People are sovereign, however, merely begs the question: which People?
Does sovereignty reside in the People of each state, or the People of the
United States as whole? This question bears directly on the validity of state
treason laws: If sovereignty lies in the People of each state, then state trea-
son laws follow naturally; but if sovereignty resides in the People of the
United States as a whole, state treason laws can rightly be seen as encroach-
ments on federal authority.28 0
Not surprisingly, Americans have always disagreed over the wellspring
of sovereignty. To the Anti-Federalists and Republicans of the found-
ing generation, sovereignty resided in the People of each state."' s To the
Federalists, it resided in the People of the United States as a whole.8 2 Yet
sovereignty need not be a zero-sum game, and arguing strictly in favor
of one is a choice of false alternatives. In the 1793 decision of Chisholm v.
Georgia,8 3 Chief Justice Jay posited that "the sovereignty of the nation is in
the people of the nation, and the residuary sovereignty of each State in the
277 Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1o46, 1047 (C.C.D.R.I. 1842) (Case No. 18,275).
278 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereigniy and Federalism, 96YALE L.J. 1425, 1430-31 (1987).
279 Id. at 1435.
28o This latter position is precisely what some scholars in past generations used to argue
against the validity of state treason laws. John Alexander Jameson, for example, after conclud-
ing that the United States is the "only real sovereign," reasoned as follows: "Treason is a
crime against sovereignty, a violation of one's allegiance. Hence, there is really no such thing
as treason against any political body in the Union but the United States." JAMESON, supra note
244, at 55-56.
281 Amar, supra note 278, at 1452.
282 Id.
283 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,471 (1793).
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people of each State." s4 Writing in the same case, Justice Iredell articulat-
ed what has since become a hornbook definition of American sovereignty:
Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty
has not been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as
completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the
powers surrendered. The United States are sovereign as to all
powers of Government actually surrendered: Each State in the
Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved."'
Subsequent cases too numerous to list have repeated and applied this
doctrine of dual sovereignty 5 6 In the language of Madison, although the
states surrendered some of their sovereign powers to the federal govern-
ment, they retained "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty" as to all pow-
ers not surrendered.2
87
For our purposes, then, we need not resolve the full reach of state sover-
eignty, a hotly disputed topic that will always invite divided opinions."' 8 We
need only satisfy ourselves that, whatever else it entails, state sovereignty
encompasses the power to define and punish treason by levying war. On
this question, there is little doubt that the states retained such power.
First, as discussed above, the delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion debated this very question about state sovereignty in the context of
treason, concluding that the federal Constitution would limit its definition
of treason to the crime "against the United States."189 By simple application
of the canon expressio unius estexclusio alterius, the text of the Treason Clause
shows that states are free to define treason on their own.290
284 Id. at 47 1.
285 Id. at 435.
286 See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, S5 U.S. 13, 20 (1852) ("Every citizen of the United States
is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and
may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either."); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) ("It is incontestable that the Constitution established a system of
'dual sovereignty.' Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal
Government, they retained a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.") (citations omitted) (quot-
ing another source).
287 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
Thus, in setting forth federal criminal jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 specifically states that
"[niothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the
several States under the laws thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2oo6).
288 See, e.g., Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 456 (opinion of Wilson, J.) ("Who, or what, is a sovereignty?
What is his or its sovereignty? On this subject, the errors and the mazes are endless and in-
explicable.").
289 See supra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
29o Chief Justice Marshall confirms this reading of the Constitution: "The constitution
recognizes the sovereignty of the States:for it admits, that treason may be committed against them."
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,327 (1821) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the doctrine of state sovereignty developed by the Supreme
Court shows that states retained the power to define and punish treason.
Like an archer's quiver, sovereignty includes many arrows, including the
ability to make war, enter treaties, tax, provide for the common good, and so
on. At the very core of sovereignty-the indispensable arrow, so to speak-
is the right of the sovereign to demand allegiance of the governed. At its
most basic level, as expressed by Chief Justice Jay, "Sovereignty is the right
to govern ..".2."I" Although the People of the states ceded some sovereign
powers to the federal government, they did not cede the most basic right
of the state to demand allegiance of its citizens. Because states demand
allegiance, they necessarily possess the power to prohibit and punish the
breach of allegiance."2 This is precisely what the court in Dorr held when it
reasoned that state sovereignty includes the right: to self-protection, a sov-
ereign right that includes enacting laws against treason by levying war. 93
Although Dorr is the case most on-point, we need not stop there. In
Gitlow v. New York,294 the Supreme Court confirmed that a state, as an es-
sential attribute of sovereignty, may proscribe and punish advocacy aimed
at the violent overthrow of the state government by unlawful means. 95 In
upholding New York's criminal anarchy statute, the Court held that a state
may use its police powers to punish those who make utterances threaten-
ing the overthrow of the state government through violence.196 To leave a
state powerless to protect against subversion would "imperil its own ex-
istence as a constitutional State." 97 "In short," the Court said, "this free-
dom [of speech and assembly] does not deprive a State of the primary and
291 Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). Allegiance is the price citizens pay for
the state's corresponding obligation to provide protection. See, e.g., Green's Case, 8 Ct. Cl. 412,
417 (1872) ("This owing of allegiance, and this betraying, treachery, or breach of faith, in the
case of resident aliens, is ascribed, it is believed, by every writer who is an authority upon the
subject, to the reciprocal obligation of protection on the part of the government.").
292 Treason, in its simplest terms, is the breach of allegiance owed to the sovereign. See
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76,97 (1820) ("Treason is a breach of allegiance,
and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance either perpetual or temporary.");
United States v. Rahman, 189 E3d 88, 113 (2d Cit. 1999) ("[Alny acceptable recitation of the
elements of treason must include the breach of allegiance.").
293 See 2 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 122, at 1565; see also State v. Raley, 136
N.E.2d 295, 305 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (holding that the sovereignty of the states gives the
states authority to enact laws that safeguard their sovereignty) aff'd sub noma. State v. Morgan,
133 N.E.2d 104 (Ohio 1956) vacated sub nom. Raley v. Ohio, 354 U.S. 929 (1957) and vacated
Morgan v. Ohio, 354 U.S. 929 (1957) aff'dper curiam on remand sub nom. State v. Morgan 147
N.E.2d 847 (Ohio 1958) aff'din part, rv'dinpantsub nom. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
294 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
295 Id. at 667-68.
296 Id. at 667.
297 Id.
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essential right of self preservation; which, so long as human governments
endure, they cannot be denied." '
Gitlow's doctrinal core-that, the First Amendment notwithstanding, a
state's inherent right of self-preservation allows it to criminalize utterances
aimed at the violent overthrow of the state government-was strengthened
thirty years later by Pennsylvania v. Nelson.29 There, the Supreme Court
considered Whether the 1948 iteration of the Smith Act,3°° a federal law
that prohibits knowingly advocating the overthrow of the United States'
government by force or violence, preempted the Pennsylvania Sedition
Act, a state law that proscribed the same conduct.30 ' The Court held that
in enacting the Smith Act, Congress intended to "occupy the field of sedi-
tion" against the United States, thereby preempting the Pennsylvania state
law at issue.3"' But this did not mean that states lack power to guard against
sedition. The problem in Nelson was that the state statute was not limited
to sedition against Pennsylvania; rather, it also extended to sedition against
the United States, and the facts before the Court related to acts aimed solely
against the United States.30 3 Although the Smith Act preempted the state
statute, the Court went to great lengths t6 stress the narrowness of its hold-
ing. It stated:
It should be said at the outset that the decision in this case does
not affect the right of States to enforce their sedition laws at
times when the Federal Government has not occupied the field
and is not protecting the entire country from seditious conduct.
298 Id. at 668
299 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
300 Smith Act of 1940, ch. 439, §§ 2 & 5, 54 Stat. 670, 671 (as amended ch. 645, Pub. L.
No. 80-772,62 Stat. 683,8o8 (1948)) (current version codified as amended at i8 U.S.C. § 2385
(2012)).
301 Nelson, 350 U.S. at 478-79. Regarding preemption, Congress may expressly preempt
state law in federal legislation itself, or a federal court may decide that Congress has impliedly
intended to preempt state law. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and the American Federal
System, 55 WAYNE L. REv. 1487, 1514-25 (2009) (providing examples of explicit preemption
and implied preemption).
3o2 Nelson, 350 U.S. at 504; see also id. at 509 ("Since we find that Congress has occupied
the field to the exclusion of parallel state legislation, that the dominant interest of the Federal
Government precludes state intervention, and that administration of state Acts would conflict
with the operation of the federal plan, we are convinced that the decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania [holding that the state law was preempted] is unassailable.").
303 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision, which the Supreme Court affirmed in
its entirety, stated it thus:
And, while the Pennsylvania statute proscribes sedition against either the Govern-
ment of the United States or the Government of Pennsylvania, it is only alleged
sedition against the United States with which the instant case is concerned. Out
of all the voluminous testimony, we have not found, nor has anyone pointed to, a
single word indicating a seditious act or even utterance directed against the Gov-
ernment of Pennsylvania.
Nelson, 350 U.S. at 499.
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... Neither does it limit the right of the State to protect itself
at any time against sabotage or attempted violence of all kinds.
Nor does it prevent the State from prosecuting where the same
act constitutes both a federal offense and a state offense under
the police power .... 3'
Thus, Pennsylvania remained free to protect itself against sedition of all
kinds. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court made it unmistakably clear
that Nelson did not prevent a state from enacting anti-sedition laws aimed
at protecting the state itself.30 5
Although Gitlow and Nelson dealt with state sedition laws and not trea-
son specifically, the same reasoning applies to treason statutes.3°6 Treason
and sedition are closely related; both are political offenses having the same
central aim of the subverting the government. The main difference is
that sedition is the advocacy of force or violence against the government,
whereas treason consists of the actual overt acts of violence.3" 7 In our sys-
tem of dual sovereigns, if states retained the power to protect against se-
dition-and Gitlow, Nelson and their progeny show that they did-then it
follows that the states also retained the power to protect against subversive
acts such as levying war against the state.
This conclusion requires us to refine our thinking about the meaning
of "exclusive" federal criminal jurisdiction. In civil cases, state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution or a fed-
eral statute,3"' but federal criminal jurisdiction is different. Due to the pre-
rogatives of the federal sovereign to prosecute violations of its own penal
laws, the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
304 Id. at 500 (footnote omitted).
305 See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 76 (1959) ("The basis of Nelson thus rejects
the notion that it stripped the States of the right to protect themselves. All the opinion pro-
scribed was a race between federal and state prosecutors to the courthouse door. The opinion
made clear that a State could proceed with prosecutions for sedition against the State itself;
that it can legitimately investigate in this area follows a fortiori.").
306 At least one court has interpreted Nelson as having broader applicability, including
treason. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F Supp. 556, 562 & n.7 (E.D. La. 1964) (construing
Nelson, "[Ilit would appear that the state may validly proceed with prosecutions of sedition,
treason, subversive activities and communist activities, carried on within the State and di-
rected at the State alone.") (emphasis added) rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
307 Sedition consists of "an agreement, communication, or other preliminary activity
aimed at inciting treason or some lesser commotion against public authority." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1479 (9th ed. 2009). "The difference between sedition and treason is that the
former is committed by preliminary steps, while the latter entails some overt act for carrying
out the plan." Id. The federal law of sedition is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2012) (seditious
conspiracy) and 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012) (advocating overthrow of government).
308 See, e.g., Grubb v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470,476 (1930) (noting that "state and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, save in exceptional instances where the jurisdiction has
been restricted by Congress to the federal courts") (citations omitted).
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over federal crimes.3°9 That pattern has held to today so that, absent con-
gressional approval, state courts are not authorized to decide cases arising
under federal criminal statutes.31 ° People v. Lynch3 11 and Exparte Quarrier12
both applied this basic framework and held that state courts lack jurisdic-
tion to decide charges of treason against the United States. In our federal
system, states exercise authority over all criminal matters except those that
are granted to the federal government under the Constitution.
3 13
Just as the United States has the prerogative to enforce its penal laws,
individual states can enforce their own penal laws, so long as doing so does
not interfere with the powers granted exclusively to the federal govern-
ment. What happens, then, when criminal conduct falls within the area
of overlap between federal and state power? This is the very problem, as
noted earlier, that Madison struggled with during the debate over the Trea-
son Clause.314 The answer, developed through a series of decisions, is quite
straightforward: both sovereigns can punish the crime.315 "It is black-letter
law that an act defined as a crime by both national and state sovereignties
is 'an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished
by each.1' 3 16
309 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § i i, i Stat. 73, 78.
310 I8 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012) ("The district courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States. Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts
of the several States under the laws thereof.").
311 People v. Lynch, t i Johns. 549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814).
312 ExparteQuarrier, 2 W.Va. 569 (i866).
313 For a review of the basic principles relating to federal-state jurisdiction, see Sedler,
supra note 301. Regarding the basic allocation of power between the federal government and
the states, Professor Sedler writes that "[t]he states exercise full sovereignty over domestic
matters except to the extent that a particular exercise of such sovereignty is prohibited or
restricted by the Constitution." Id. at 1488.
314 Seesupra note 6o and accompanying text.
315 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (holding that one state's prosecution
did not preclude other states from prosecuting the same offense); Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S. 187, 194-96 (1959) (relying on Lanza to conclude that a state-court conviction will
not prevent federal authorities from prosecuting a crime based on the same conduct); Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1959) (holding that federal-court action will not prevent
state authorities from subsequent prosecution of the same conduct); United States v. Lanza,
26o U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (holding that two punishments for the same act did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because "[w]e have here two sovereign-
ties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter
within the same territory.... It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and
state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished
by each"); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 33 (18zo) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("Why
may not the same offence be made punishable both under the laws of the States, and of the
United States? Every citizen of a State owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and
participates in the government of both the State and the United States.").
316 United States v. Gerhard, 615 E3d 7, 25 (ist Cir. 2010) (quoting Lanza, 26o U.S. at
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With respect to treason by levying war, then, this means that a single
overt act could be treason against (1) the United States only, (2) the United
States and a single state, or (3) against a single state only. The state court
would have jurisdiction over (2) and (3), but not over treasonous acts that
involved the United States only.317
With these principles of dual sovereignty and federal criminal jurisdic-
tion in mind, the question whether levying war against one state consti-
tutes treason against the entire Union is quite simple. Even if we accept
the premise that levying war against one state is an offense to all or that the
Guarantee Clause requires the federal government to come to the aid of a
state in response to treason against the state, the state-a dual sovereign-
would not lose its ability to punish the crime through its law and in its
courts; although the federal government has jurisdiction to punish acts that
violate its treason law, state authorities are not ousted from their domain.
B. Adhering to the State's Enemies, Giving Them Aid and Comfort
With respect to state treason for "adhering to the enemies of the state,"
different considerations arise. As demonstrated above, each state has the
constitutional authority to proscribe treason. But that does not mean that
the content of the law has no bounds, and as a matter of substantive treason
law, there is a compelling case that treason against a state by adhering to the
state's enemies is impossible.
Like many aspects of American treason law, the phrase "adhering to
their enemies" has its origins in English law. Under the Statute of 25 Ed-
ward III, treason reached those who were "adherent to the king's enemies
... [giving them] aid and comfort in the realm."31 The King's "enemies"
referred to foreign sovereigns, not domestic foes.319 When the Framers bor-
382); see also Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. I, 87 (1996) ("In other words, if a distinct state interest
is identified, the fact that the criminal act may also fall within the constitutionally 'exclu-
sive' federal jurisdiction will not present a constitutional bar to state prosecution for the same
act."). Although the rule is firmly established, it still has detractors. See, e.g., PETER W. Low
AND JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL'LAW 16-17 (1997) (noting the American Civil
Liberties Union's long opposition to the dual-sovereignty doctrine and providing examples).
As a practical matter, any unfairness in application of the doctrine is mitigated by the fact that
many states prohibit prosecution following a federal prosecution, and the United States also
has a policy of not prosecuting following a state prosecution. Seeid. at 15-16.
317 See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 505 (3d ed. 1982).
318 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 8z.
319 See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES I I
(London, W. Clarke and Sons 18o9) ("[Tihe subjects of the king, though they be in open war
or rebellion against the king, yet are they not the king's enemies, but traitors; for enemies be
those that be out of the allegiance of the king. Ifa subject join with a foreign enemy, and come
into England with him, he shall not be taken prisoner here and ransomed, or proceeded with
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rowed the word "enemies" for use in the Treason Clause, they also im-
ported its common-law meaning.
32 °
The Civil-War era case of United States v. Greathouse demonstrates this
point.31 There, the United States indicted several individuals for "engag-
ing in, and giving aid and comfort to, the existing rebellion against the gov-
ernment of the United States. ' 322 The court held that domestic insurgents
were not "enemies" within the meaning of the Treason Clause. In charging
the jury, Chief Justice Field stated: "The term 'enemies,'. . . according to
its settled meaning, at the time the constitution was adopted, applies only
to the subjects of a foreign power in a state of open hostility with us. It
does not embrace rebels in insurrection against their own government. An
enemy is always the subject of a foreign power who owes no allegiance to
our government or county."
323
Thus, the "adhering to their enemies" branch of the Treason Clause
examines the alleged enemy's identity and allegiance, as well as the exter-
nal state of affairs between the United States and the enemy's homeland.
The term "enemy" applies only to (1) subjects of a foreign power owing no
allegiance to the United States, and (2) at a time when that foreign power
is engaged in open hostilities against the United States. With respect to
the second criteria, some courts and commentators have taken this concept
further, stating that "enemies" only exist if the United States has formally
declared war against the foreign power.324 But the majority view-and the
as an enemy shall, but he shall be taken as a traitor to the king.") (modernized spelling); see
also James Willard Hurst, English Sources of the American Law of Treason, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 315,
3 19-20 & 351 n.77 (1945) (examining English authorities who establish that that "adherence
to enemies" applied to external enemies during wartime, not domestic controversies); Jabez
W. Loane, Treason andAiding the Enemy, 30 MIL: L. REV. 43,61 (1965) ("Who is the 'enemy' for
the purpose of receiving this aid and adherence? In the English cases, oriented as usual with
monarchical concepts, it was the foreign sovereign himself.").
320 See, e.g., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F Cas. 1039, 1039 (D. Mass. I861) ("These terms,
'levying war,' 'adhering to enemies,' 'giving them aid and comfort,' were not new. They had
been well known in English jurisprudence at least as far back as the reign of Edw. III. They
had been frequently the subject ofjudicial exposition, and their meaning was to a great extent
well settled.").
321 United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 12,524).
322 Id. at 21.
323 Id. at 22; see also Stephan v. United States, 133 Ed 87, 94 (6th Cit. 1943) (German
secret agent and spy operating in the United States was an "enemy" under the Treason Clause
because "[hie was the subject of a foreign power in a state of open hostility with us"); United
States v. Haupt, 47 E Supp. 836,839 (N.D. 11. 1942) (same), rev'don othergrounds, 136 E2d 661
(7th Cir. 1943); United States v. Fricke, 259 F. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. I9i9) ("On the breaking out
of the war between the United States and the Imperial German Government, the subjects of
the Emperor of Germany were enemies of the United States ... ").
324 Fricke, 259 F at 677 ("The class of treason with which we are dealing in this case
only takes place, and only can take place, during war - when war is on"); George P. Fletcher,
Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. i61 , 1612 (2003-2004) ("According to a persuasive
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better one-is that a formal declaration of war is not necessary.3"' Still, there
must at least exist an armed conflict with a foreign power-what we might
loosely refer to as a "state of war" or "time of war"-in order to create
"enemies."
The meaning of "enemies" presents an insurmountable challenge
when applied to state treason laws. State treason laws largely track the sub-
stantive definition of treason contained in the Treason Clause, including
the "adhering to [the state's] enemies" language. To violate this branch of
treason, the state itself must have "enemies" such that adhering to them
is treason, which makes little sense because states cannot have "enemies"
within the common-law meaning of the word. States cannot declare war or
otherwise engage in armed hostilities with foreign powers. Article I, § 8 of
the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare and conduct war.3"6
line of cases, the concept of 'enemy' applies only in a declared war."); accord I Op. Att'y Gen.
84 (1854) ("[Tihere exists not only an actual maritime war between France and the United
States, but a maritime war authorized by both nations. Consequently, France is our enemy;
and to aid, assist, and abet that nation in her maritime warfare, will be treason in a citizen or
other person within the United States not commissioned under France.").
325 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
999, 1017-19 (ZOO5) (arguing that a declared war is unnecessary and that foreign terrorists can
be "enemies" within the meaning of the Treason Clause); Paul T Crane, Did the Court Kill
the Treason Chage?: Reassessing Cramer v. United States and Its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 635, 686-93 (2009) (reviewing cases and concluding that a formal declaration of war is
not necessary); Loane, supra note 319, at 62 ("The offense of treason by aiding and abetting
the enemy can only be committed during time of war. But it does not necessarily follow that
the war must be attired with all the customary trimmings, such as a formal declaration." The
author concludes that "aiding the enemy could well be committed in an escalated 'cold war'
situation."); Francis S. Ruddy, Permissible Dissent or Treason? The American Law of Treason: An
Examination of the American Law of Treason, from Its English and Colonial Origins to the Present, 4
CRIM. L. BULL. 145, 153 (1968) (reviewing authorities and concluding that "the law as it now
stands would seem to regard opponents in an undeclared war, i.e. armed conflict with a foreign
or government, 'enemies' within the meaning of the treason law")..
326 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; see also, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286,
287 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting that "a separate State cannot wage war: that is the
prerogative of the general government"). Article I, § to of the Constitution outlines a narrow
circumstance in which states can engage in war. It states that "[nio state shall, without the
Consent of Congress,... engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger
as will not admit of delay." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § Io. However, as the text makes clear, the states'
ability to engage in war is strictly defensive and any defensive measures taken by states would
be short-lived because the United States is constitutionally mandated to protect each state
against invasion and provide for the common defense. See U.S. CONsT. art IV, § 3; U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8; seealso Commonwealth v. Blodgett, 53 Mass. 56, 82 (Mass. 1846) ("But the States are
expressly prohibited from entering into any treaty, alliance or confederation, or, without the
consent of congress, to enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or engage in
war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. They are,
therefore, in the condition of States sovereign to some purposes, but who have by compact
renounced and relinquished their sovereign powers, in regard to war and peace, and, of course,
to the regulation and control of the incidents to war and peace, except the power of taking
warlike measures, strictly and purely defensive, in case of an exigency, which will admit of
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Article II, § 2 makes the President the Commander in Chief of the armed
forces, including state militias, and gives the President the power over trea-
ties and external affairs.3"7 In the enduring language of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, "In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one people....
and the government which is alone capable of controlling and managing
their interests in all these respects, is the government of the Union."3 8
Thus, while the states retained the power to protect against seditious con-
duct of their own citizens, including the power to define and punish trea-
son by levying war against the state, they did not retain the power to create
"enemies" as that term has been developed historically and through case
law.
This conclusion, of course, is not immune from critique. One could ar-
gue that when the United States engages in war with a foreign power, then
that foreign power becomes an "enemy" to each state in the Union. But
just as levying war against the United States is not war against each individ-
ual state,3"9 war between the United States and a foreign power does make
the foreign power an enemy to each state. The case of People v. Lynch-the
only state case in which the "adhering to the state's enemies" branch was
at issue-illustrates this point. There, the court dismissed the indictment
because it was the United States, not New York, that declared war against
Great Britain, and therefore the British soldiers who had received food and
supplies from the defendants were not enemies of the state.33 ° Thus, Lynch
implicitly holds that the United States' enemies ipsofacto are not enemies
of each state as well.
One could also argue that while the term "enemies" under the Trea-
son Clause requires a state of war against a foreign power, the states are
free to define their own law of treason, and a state could define "enemies"
no delay. In all other respects, the power of making war and peace, of treaties and alliances,
is vested absolutely and exclusively in the general government, with their incidents. But as
a compensation for this surrender, the general government of the United States is bound to
protect each State against invasion, and against domestic violence."). Given the narrowness of
the exception, it does not alter the conclusion that individual states lack war-making power
for purposes of the "adhering to the enemies" branch of treason.
327 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2; see also, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)
(noting that "power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively"); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (holding that
"complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot
be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states").
328 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 413-14 (182 1).
329 See Ex Parte Quarrier, 2 W. Va. 569, 572 (I866) (holding that to "constitute treason
against the State, it is not enough to wage war against the United States generally or collec-
tively, or as component parts of the national Union, but it must be done directly against the
State, in particular....").
330 See People v. Lynch, i i Johns. 549, 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814).
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to include domestic foes.33' But this critique is lacking in at least two re-
spects. First, it is a bedrock rule of statutory construction that identical
words should be given the same meaning unless the legislature directs oth-
erwise. 3 1 Although this rule usually applies when identical words appear
within the same statute, in many instances, states borrow from the United
States Constitution or federal statutes. In those cases, state courts look to
the meaning of the words under federal authorities. 333 This is especially
true when the words borrowed are technical terms whose meaning is root-
ed in a long history, as is the case with the language in the Treason Clause.
In commenting on the term "levying war," for instance, Chief Justice Mar-
shall wrote that because it is a technical term borrowed from English law,
"[iut is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers
of our constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from
whom we borrowed it." 334
Just as federal courts interpreting the Treason Clause have looked to
English authorities for help with the meaning of the words borrowed from
that country, state courts have done the same. The phrase "adhering to
their enemies" has a long history, both in England and this country. To
paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall, it is scarcely conceivable that the states
used that phrase without intending to affix the meaning developed by
those from whom it was borrowed.
Second, if a state's definition of "enemies" included domestic foes, trea-
son under the "adhering to the state's enemies" branch would be superflu-
ous. As the court in Greathouse explained, "[e]very act which, if performed
with regard to a public and foreign enemy, would amount to 'an adhering to
him, giving him aid and comfort,' will, with regard to a domestic rebellion,
constitute levying war." '335 Under the facts of Greathouse, for example, even
331 Indeed, at least one early state statute specifically included domestic enemies win
the definition of treason. See Md. Act of March 6, 186I (codified in Laws of the State of Mary-
land 251 (Thomas Wilson, ed. 1862)) (making it treason to "adhere to the enemies [of the
state], whether foreign or domestic, giving them aid or comfort") (emphasis added).
332 See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 85I, 860 (1986) (noting the "normal
rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning") (citations 6mitted).
333 See, e.g., Ghant v. Comm'r of Corr., 761 A.2d 740, 749 n. 16 (Conn. 2000) (noting that
"the due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions generally have the same
meaning and impose similar constitutional limitations"); Kahn v. Kahn, 68 Cal. App. 3d 372,
384 (1977) (in discussing California's Code of Civil Procedure, noting that "[t]hese statutes
are, in substance, exact counterparts of the federal rules. Therefore, the Legislature must have
intended that they should have the same meaning, force and effect as have been given the
federal rules by the federal courts.") (citations omitted) (quotation in original).
334 United States v. Burr, 25 E Cas. 55, 159 (C.C.Va. 1807).
335 United States v. Greathouse, 26 E Cas. I8 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (Case No. 12,524);
see also id. at 23 ("[Fior every species of aid and comfort which, if given to a foreign enemy,
would constitute treason within the second clause of the constitutional provision-adhering
to the enemies of the United States-would, if given to the rebels in the insurrection against
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though Confederate soldiers were not "enemies," and therefore those who
aided the Confederacy could not be guilty of treason for adhering to an
enemy, they could rightly be charged with treason by levying war against
the government based on the same conduct.
336
In sum, if an accused adhered to domestic foes, giving them aid and com-
fort through overt acts, such a person could likely be dealt with under a
state's "levying war" rubric. If an accused adhered to foreign enemies, giving
them aid and comfort, such a person would fall within the reach of the
Treason Clause and become subject to federal prosecution; and because
the powers to make war and deal with foreign nations are exclusively fed-
eral powers, the state court would not have jurisdiction over such a case.
In either scenario, a state law against "adhering to the state's enemies"
is unnecessary. The federal sovereign, of course, ought to maintain both
branches of treason because it demands allegiance from its citizens and has
the power to wage war against foreign powers. But it makes far less sense
when applied to the states. Although states demand allegiance from their
citizens-and therefore have the power to criminalize acts such as "levying
war" by citizens against the state-they have no power to create enemies
by waging war with foreign powers.
If treason by "adhering to the enemies of the state" is impossible, how
do we explain the fact that forty-three states allow for criminal liability
through this branch of treason? The answer may be that the first state
treason statutes were drafted prior to the Constitution in an era when in-
dividual states had not fully ceded to the federal government the power
to engage in war with foreign powers.3 7 Under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, states waged war against Native American tribes, maintained stand-
ing armies, and even conducted negotiations with foreign powers. 3 8 The
the government, constitute a levying of war under the first clause.").
336 Id. at 29;see also ExparteBollman, 8 U.S. 75, 112 (1807) ("An adherence to rebels, is
not an adherence to an enemy within the meaning of the constitution. Hence if the prisoners
are guilty, it must be of levying war against the United States.").
337 As discussed above, most of the original states had treason statutes prior to the Revo-
lution of 1776. See Treason I, supra note 19, at 232. And all of the states except Georgia enacted
state treason statutes while operating under the Articles of Confederation. See supra text ac-
companying note 26.
338 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 278, at 1447-48. The Articles of Confederation attempted
to restrict the states' powers with respect to war and foreign affairs. See ARTICLES OF CON-
FEDERATION art. VI, para. i ("No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress
assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any confer-
ence, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State."); id. at art. VI, para. 5 ("No
State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled,
unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a
resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is
so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be
consulted."). But states routinely ignored the authority of Congress and acted in their own
interests with respect to war and foreign affairs. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Col-
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states, therefore, could create "enemies." Nevertheless, after ratification of
the Constitution, states continued to rely on the pre-Constitution statutes
or enacted new laws that repeated the same language. As new states joined
the Union, they in turn patterned their new constitutions after the federal
Constitution, including the Treason Clause, as well as the existing state
laws of other states. In short, current state laws are based more on history,
tradition, and inertia, not any reasoned analysis of how the "adhering to the
enemies" branch of treason operates at the state level.
CONCLUSION
This article has collected the key authorities, summarized the key cas-
es, and analyzed the key issues relating to whether states can criminalize
treason. With the evidence in, we can say confidently that states have the
power to define and punish treason, but we have also learned that a reas-
sessment of the substance and need for state treason laws is long overdue.
State treason laws date to the founding of the Republic when state security
played a much larger role. Their continued relevance, however, is question-
able. State treason laws are like a rusty tool in the backyard shed: we have a
vague sense that the tool was useful at some point, so we would rather not
discard it; but for now, we cannot imagine why we need it or how it ought
to be used.
This article raises several issues that could guide state policy makers as
they reassess state treason laws. Although not an exhaustive list, policy mak-
ers ought to consider the following: First, is there a need for a law against
treason? Today, seven states do not have laws defining treason against the
state.339 Does anybody really think that Hawaii, Maryland, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee are more susceptible
to subversion and attack than the states that criminalize treason? These
seven states would not forego treason laws if such laws had any practical
impact on states' use of its police powers. Acknowledging that a treason
law is obsolete, in other words, does not leave the state powerless against
subversion. In light of the exhaustive codes of criminal conduct, it is dif-
ficult to think of an act that could be deemed "treason" that would not also
lective Action, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1241, 1254 (1997). In fact, the need for the federal government
to speak with one voice in foreign affairs was among the key drivers that led to the creation of
the Constitution. See, e.g., 1I1E FEDERALIST NO. 42, 302 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., i961) ("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect
of other nations."); id. at 303 (noting that the Articles of Confederation left the confederacy
of states "in the power of any indiscreet [state] to embroil the Confederacy with foreign na-
tions").
339 These states are Hawaii, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Tennessee.
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fall within the definition of some other state crime.34° Nonetheless, despite
the dubious practical usefulness of state treason laws, it remains within the
states' prerogative to criminalize treason. States may validly conclude that
keeping a treason law on the books carries significant weight theoretically
and symbolically. Such considerations may outweigh the desire to scrub
obsolete laws from the statute books.
Second, is the substance of the treason law consistent with historical
understandings and case law? The term "adhering to the enemies of the
state," for instance, has a long common law history that should not be ig-
nored. All forty-three states that maintain treason laws include treason by
adhering to the enemies of the state. Yet hundreds of years of common
law history and well-reasoned cases such as United States v. GreathouS 4'
and People v. Lynch 2 show that individual states cannot have "enemies."
Enemies are subjects of a foreign power at war with the United States, and
because states lack the power to wage war or conduct foreign relations,
they cannot create enemies. Thus, state policymakers ought to consider
deleting this branch of treason from the statute books altogether. Alterna-
tively, if it must remain, states should clearly define the word "enemies" in
the statute, thereby giving notice of the conduct that violates the law. As it
stands currently, the definition of that term makes no sense when applied
in the state context.
Third, is the state's law consistent with the American policy of narrowly
restricting the conduct that amounts to treason? The key lesson from the
constitutional debate over the Treason Clause is that the Framers recog-
nized the dangers of broad and indeterminate treason laws and took steps
to restrict the crime. States, for example, should not include conspiracy
within the definition of treason, as that expands the circle of punishable
conduct. Vermont, the only state that continues to do so, should consider
amending its law by deleting the references to conspiracy. The better prac-
tice, illustrated by Minnesota, is to specifically exclude conspiracy in the
definition of the crime. 3
Fourth, do state treason laws inappropriately encroach on the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal courts? Due to the doctrine of dual sovereignty, "ex-
clusive" federal jurisdiction does not mean that states lack the power to
criminalize acts that also run afoul of federal criminal law, and vice versa.
340 As the commentary to Alabama's treason statute states, "the classical definition of
treason is broad enough to cover overt acts as they appear, and most if not all of the activities
that one can conceive of as being directed against the state of Alabama are independently
criminal under other provisions of the Criminal Code." ALA. CODE § 13A-I I-2 (1975) (com-
mentary). Although it has no treason law, New York has a criminal anarchy statute that prohib-
its advocacy to overthrow the existing form of government by violence. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.15 (McKinney 2oo8).
341 United States v. Greathouse, 26 E Cas. I8 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (Case No. 12,524).
342 People v. Lynch, I IJohns. 549, 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814).
343 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.38 5 (West 2009).
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Still, as Pennsylvania v. Nelson and its progeny illustrate, although states
may punish acts aimed at the state, the state law must not include acts
against the United States, as such acts are preempted by federal law.3" In
this connection, one state-Louisiana-defines treason to include levying
war "against the United States" and adhering to the enemies "of the United
States." Louisiana should consider amending its law and other states should
avoid such language.
Finally, have legislative actions over the years resulted in inconsisten-
cies and ambiguities in the state's treason law? Most notable in this regard
is the fact that twenty-one states define treason by constitutional provi-
sion but contain no corresponding penalty for the offense.3 45 Many of these
same states previously had statutes that imposed a penalty for treason but
repealed those statutes without addressing the constitutional provisions.
346
The result is that we are left to guess whether the constitutional provisions
are self-executing and enforceable or, as is more likely, non-self-execut-
ing nullities.3 7 Inconsistencies also arise in the seven states that currently
have no treason law. Although the legislatures in those states repealed the
substantive offense, they failed to account for other provisions of state law
that refer to or incorporate the crime.348 Such provisions are meaningless
and only clutter and confuse the states' statutory laws.
344 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 48 (1956).
345 See supra note i 18 and accompanying text.
346 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:1 4 8-I (West 2011) (providing penalty upon proof of
treason), repealed by Act of Aug. 1o, 1978, 1978 N.J. Laws 687-88, effective Sept. 1, 1979.
347 See Older v. Sup. Ct., 157 Cal. 770,780 (0IO).
348 See infra note 95 and accompanying text (all states except Hawaii, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have laws defining treason against
the state).
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